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DETERMINANTS OF NONPARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

by

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December 1997

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**DETERMINANTS OF NONPARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
RESERVE**

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing that resulted in the active force having to rely on Reserve component support. Enlisted losses in the USAR, however, have been increasing. For FY 97, approximately 23% of enlisted losses were due to unsatisfactory participation. These losses equate to lost training dollars and decreased force readiness. The objectives of this thesis are to identify the factors that lead to unsatisfactory participation within U.S. Army Reserve units, and recommend changes which should lead to increased participation and force readiness. This study has used a methodology that involved talking to reservists, who left their units, to discuss the reasons and timing of their decisions to depart. An integrated model has been developed as a framework to study the Reserve organizational socialization process. Many identified unmet expectations in training and leadership areas, and many exited because they were unable to resolve these dissatisfactions. Unit leadership exacerbated these problems through little or ineffective attempts to rectify the reservists' problems, as well as inadequate efforts to influence the reservist to return to the unit. Recommendations include: providing new reservists realistic job previews; emphasizing the importance of the first training weekend and the sponsorship program in leadership training; expanding the unit retention sergeant's duties to cover the entire scope of the retention process; and publicizing and rewarding "best practices."

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing that resulted in the active force having to increasingly rely on Reserve component support. Soon after, the Gulf War required the largest Reserve activation and mobilization since WWII. These events marked the beginning of a change in the mission for the Army Reserve, and its integration into the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Total Force Policy. The primary objectives of the Total Force Policy are to maintain a small, active, peacetime force able to meet the National Military Strategy, and to integrate the capabilities of active and reserve forces into a more cost-effective fighting force. To meet these objectives, more combat support and combat service support capabilities have been transferred to the Reserve. Approximately 40% of the Army's support forces are currently in the Reserve ("History of the Army Reserve," 1997, 6). As evidence of their new role, the Army Times recently reported that reservists have been called three times in the last five years to reduce the burden on the active Army. Presently, approximately 10,000 reservists are serving in Bosnia (Ledford, 1997, 26). With the increased reliance on the Army Reserve, unit readiness and deployability has become a vital concern to Army leadership. Historically, in order to be deployed, a combat unit had to meet or exceed a personnel readiness rating of 85%, and support forces had to meet or exceed a personnel readiness rating of 65% (Sorter et al., 1995, 32). A 1995 Rand Report identified that the average Reserve unit activated for the Gulf War had a personnel readiness rate of only 63%. The shortfall was due to unfilled positions (11%), and

positions filled with soldiers waiting to complete training to be duty qualified (26%) (Orvis et al., 1995, xii). These shortfalls can be directly attributed to a high personnel turnover rate in the Reserves. Many of these losses can be linked to nonparticipation, which occurs when reservists decide to stop attending unit training sessions (drills). A reduction in personnel turnover would ultimately result in budget savings, as well as an overall increase in total force readiness.

To address the issue of nonparticipation, an integrated conceptual model has been developed from Jablin's stages of socialization and the theory of psychological contracts. In general, this model contains the stages of anticipatory socialization, encounter, metamorphosis, and assimilation. The model provides a framework to examine the organizational socialization process as it applies to the context of the Army Reserve, and guides the study of the reasons a reservist exits the unit.

B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The two main objectives of this thesis are as follows:

1. Identify and analyze the factors leading to unsatisfactory participation within U.S. Army Reserve units.
2. Recommend changes which should lead to increased participation and force readiness.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question is: What factors influence members to stop participating in Reserve unit drills? The subsidiary research questions, organized to correspond to the integrated model, are:

Anticipatory Socialization

1. What are the sources of information about the Army Reserve program, and are they accurate?
2. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are they accurate?
3. What is the role of the recruiter in anticipatory socialization?

Encounter

1. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter stage?
2. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the encounter stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?
3. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?

Metamorphosis

1. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?
2. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?

Exit

1. After a reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?
2. What would influence a reservist to rejoin a Reserve unit, and is it related to the reason he exited?
3. What recommendations do nonparticipants have for Army Reserve leadership to reduce nonparticipation?

D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This thesis focuses on factors which lead enlisted members of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to fail to participate in unit drills and training. Failure to attend unit drills results in reservists' involuntary transfer to the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR). Although procedures exist for reservists to voluntarily transfer into the IRR, only enlisted reservists who were involuntarily transferred were included in this research. The study was limited to involuntary transfers to determine the reasons prompting reservists to accept negative consequences, such as loss of rank, as a result of being classified as unsatisfactory participants.

Additionally, the sampling frame only includes the unsatisfactory participants recorded in the United States Army Reserve (USAR) database for fiscal year 1997. Also, the sample was limited to 100 respondents, which is relatively small compared to the population of nonparticipating members.

As with any research method which involves interview protocols, both the questions and data are subject to the both the skill and interpretation of the researcher. Furthermore, the respondents in the sample, who have failed to fulfill Reserve contract obligations, may have attribution biases which place blame for their behavior on the institution or others rather than on themselves.

E. METHODOLOGY

The first step consisted of a literature review regarding the organization of the Reserve, their emerging role in national defense, and, finally, budget and personnel issues impacting readiness. The second step involved reviewing social science research to determine a theoretical framework for analyzing the specific problem of unsatisfactory

participation. Based on initial examination of the problem of unsatisfactory participation within the body of related organizational management research, the third step was to design an interview protocol to capture data to answer the research questions. The method chosen was a telephonic interview consisting of qualitative, open-end questions which allowed opportunities to expand or probe responses. A sample of 100 telephonic interviews of nonparticipating members was taken using the USAR database list, and then coded for entry into Minitab and Excel for statistical analysis. The final step was to discuss the results of the statistical data analysis and provide recommendations to increase member participation in the Reserve.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and outlines the thesis' objectives, scope, limitations and research questions. Chapter II provides an overview of the Army Reserve, addressing composition of the force, the USAR's emerging role in the Total Force Policy, newcomer entry and assimilation, and finally, discusses the problem of personnel turnover due to unsatisfactory participation. Chapter III discusses the theoretical framework of the study, and consists of a literature review of research relevant to the topic of personnel turnover. The discussion includes a general overview of exchange theory, equity theory, psychological contracts, met expectation theory, realistic job previews, and the stages of socialization. These theories formed the framework of the study, and fostered the development of an integrated conceptual model which will be used to study the problem of nonparticipation in the Army Reserve. Chapter IV explains the research methodology used to collect and analyze the data. Chapter V presents the data, and Chapter VI provides the discussion,

conclusions, and recommendations.

II. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The mission of the U.S. Army Reserve is to "meet Department of the Army (DA) contingency operations or mobilization requirements" (AR 140-1 1). As the drawdown of the Total Force continues and the potential for regional conflicts requiring the short notice deployment of large numbers of soldiers increases, the Army will have to increasingly rely on the Reserve to fill/augment force and mission requirement gaps. Currently, the Reserve is the Army's primary source of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets. According to one Rand Report, the Reserve Component is expected to constitute 39 percent of the nation's defense force by fiscal year 1999 (Buddin & Kirby, 1996, 2). The issue of Reserve readiness, then, is critical to our national military strategy, and is of great concern to congressional policymakers.

The first section of Chapter II provides an overview of the composition of the Reserve, and discusses unit deployment requirements. The discussion includes a brief description of the readiness/deployment issues the Reserve experienced during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The second and third sections discuss the process of integrating a new reservist into a unit, and identify responsibilities of unit members as well as the obligations of the new reservist. The remaining section specifically addresses the problem of unsatisfactory participation, the replacement costs, and the impact on unit readiness.

B. ROLE OF THE SELECT RESERVE

This section addresses the increased role of the Army Reserve based on the Total Force Policy, and the composition of the Reserve force. The discussion also includes readiness requirements for units, and reviews the deployment issues that were identified during the Reserve mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

1. Total Force Policy

The Total Force Policy of 1973 coincided with the end of the draft and the beginning of the all-volunteer force at the end of the Vietnam War. The policy specified that the United States maintain an active duty force with the capability of maintaining peace and deterring aggression. The active force, when necessary, would be reinforced by a "well-trained and well-equipped" Reserve Component ("History of the Army Reserve," 1997, 3). This new policy marked a shift of some responsibility for the National Military Strategy to the Army Reserve.

As the nation became more budget-conscious in the post-Cold War era, the Reserve provided a cost-effective alternative to maintaining full capability in the active force. Expanded Reserve roles include responding to regional crises, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, demonstrated by Reserve participation in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Provide Hope (Somalia), and their current participation in Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia).

The Reserve maintains a significant number of the Army's combat support and combat service support units. As a result of the transfer of these critical support capabilities to the Reserve, the Reserve has been integrated into virtually all regional and theater operational plans ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 2). Issues of readiness,

therefore, not only affect the Reserve Component, but also affect the mission readiness and capabilities of the total force.

2. Composition

The Reserve component is organized into three manpower/management categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Figure 1 is a schematic of the composition of the Reserve. This thesis specifically focuses on the Ready Reserve. A brief overview, to include composition, policies, and procedures regarding the Ready Reserve, will be addressed for future discussion of participation and readiness issues.




Figure 1. Structure of the Reserve Component

The Ready Reserve consists of the Select Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), as well as the Inactive National Guard (ING). Members of the Ready Reserve are

subject to Presidential recall for war or for national emergencies, as prescribed in Title 10 of the United States Code ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 3).

Select Reserve members are assigned to operational units, augmentation units, Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions, or Full Time Support (FTS) positions. Operational units, or Troop Program Units (TPUs), train and deploy with unit integrity, while augmentation units train as units during peacetime, but are integrated into active Army units when mobilized. IMAs train as individuals during peacetime, and augment active Army units during wartime. Members in FTS positions are drilling members who serve as cadre for select Reserve units.

3. Personnel Readiness Requirements

Personnel readiness can be simply defined as having the right number of soldiers with the correct skills (Sorter, et al., 1994, 31). The correct skills, or training requirements of reservists, play a major role in determining personnel readiness. Initial entry training, a requirement for all reservists, is comprised of both basic training and advanced individual training. While basic training teaches all soldiers necessary combat skills, advanced individual training provides soldiers training in a specific military occupational specialty (MOS). Successful completion of these two phases of initial entry training results in the soldier being awarded a MOS, and being classified as MOS qualified. The significance of reservists who have not completed initial training and are not MOS qualified is that these reservists cannot be deployed. Approximately 20-30 percent of positions in the Reserve are filled by members who are not MOS qualified (Buddin & Grissmer, 1994, 2). This estimate, combined with the fact that most units have fewer personnel assigned than they are authorized, results in readiness ratings which may prevent units from deploying

despite the need for the capabilities of the unit.

The Army uses Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, as one measure of unit readiness. AR 220-1 outlines policies procedures for units to determine readiness. Personnel readiness is one of the requirements a unit must meet before being qualified for deployment. Personnel readiness is determined through the calculation of available strength and available MOS trained strength. Available strength is defined as the percentage of required wartime personnel who are medically, physically, and legally deployable. Available MOS trained strength (DMOSQ - duty MOS qualified) is defined as the percentage of required wartime personnel who are both available to deploy and MOS qualified for their assigned duty position (Sorter, et al., 1994, 32). These personnel readiness measures are used, along with other measures such as equipment-on-hand and training readiness, to determine a unit's overall readiness rating (C-rating). The unit's C-rating must meet or exceed the unit's Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), which designates the readiness level the unit must attain, before being qualified for deployment. Rectifying the nondeployable personnel status of the unit requires unqualified reservists to be trained (or retrained) until duty MOS qualified, or qualified reservists from other units to be transferred into the unit.

The impact of degraded readiness levels of reserve units due to personnel fill shortages and MOS qualification shortfalls was highlighted during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. On average, approximately 20% of all activated unit's personnel shortfalls had to be corrected through crossleveling (Orvis, et al., 1995, xiii). Whereas these shortfalls may not have been important in the past, the active component's increased reliance on the Reserve made personnel readiness a critical issue. Although the reservists

who were transferred into units with shortages fixed the shortfall problem, it created unit training (collective training) difficulties as these individuals had never trained with the unit they were scheduled to deploy with ("Operation Desert Storm," 1992, 35).

Personnel readiness shortfalls are driven by high rates of personnel turnover (Sorter, et al., 1994, 32). The causes of personnel turnover must first be identified, and then addressed to ensure the Reserve is ready to deploy when called as part of the total force.

C. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF RESERVISTS

Recruiting starts the joining process for a potential recruit, and retention "is the cornerstone of personnel readiness" ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 41). This section addresses the processes and policies of recruiting and retaining a new reservist in order to lay the foundation to examine potential causes of personnel turnover. It also identifies recruiting agencies, and the specific responsibilities of recruiters and key unit members to integrate the new reservist into the unit.

1. Recruiting Organizations/Process

Unlike the Active Army, which only accesses soldiers through the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), the Reserve Component has three organizations responsible for Reserve accessions. These agencies include USAREC, Department of the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Army Reserve Personnel Command (ARPERCOM). USAREC, the only organization in which recruiters access active and reserve soldiers, accounts for the majority of all reserve accessions. PERSCOM's role in the process is to use in-service recruiters located at transition points to encourage soldiers leaving the active Army to join the Reserve. ARPERCOM manages the Inactive Ready

Reserve (IRR) data base and also recruits reservists for the Select Reserve by screening the IRR database for members eligible to fill unit shortages.

The role of the recruiter, located in offices throughout the country and overseas, is to be a uniformed representative of the Army and to positively and accurately portray military life ("Military Recruiting", 1994, 13). Recruiters canvass prospective recruits through means such as making presentations at local high schools, advertising at community events, and contacting individuals directly. Additionally, the Army Reserve is advertising and recruiting through a web site on the Internet which allows interested individuals to contact recruiters in their geographical area.

After individuals have decided to enlist, the recruiter registers them for processing at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Processing at the MEPS for the recruits includes taking a standardized test (the Armed Services Vocational Battery /Armed Forces Qualification Test), which measures a soldier's quality and trainability, and taking a medical exam ("Military Recruiting," 1994, 12). Finally, the recruits choose, or are assigned a MOS based on their test scores and medical qualifications. After the recruit has a MOS, a contract is prepared for either the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), or immediate reserve or active duty. The DEP primarily allows enlistees to resolve scheduling complications and allows recruiters to coordinate allocations for initial entry training (Mitchell, 1994, 22).

Recruiting is a proactive program designed to enlist the most qualified soldiers into the Reserve and Active Components. Recruiters and other service representatives in the recruiting process influence an enlistee's first impressions and expectations of the Army Reserve. The recruiting process, however, is only the first step in the retention

process.

2. Retention Process

Retention can be defined as “the sum of leadership actions that create a positive training environment and influence soldiers to continue serving in the USAR, while enhancing units’ personnel readiness” (USARC 140-6, 1997, 3). An effective retention program, therefore, is critical to personnel readiness. The retention process begins with the assignment of new reservists from one of the accessioning agencies, and continues throughout the career of the soldier. USARC recognizes that reservists’ anxieties can be reduced through the proper integration of a soldier into a unit, and research demonstrates that first impressions of a unit impact a reservist’s decision to continue to participate (USARC 140-6, 1997, 6).

Designated individuals in the unit have responsibilities, outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6, to ensure a new reservist is properly welcomed and integrated into the unit. The majority of these responsibilities are included in the sponsorship program. The sponsorship program requires 100% sponsorship of all new reservists, and these requirements, discussed later in this chapter, are documented on a sponsorship checklist (USARC Form 62-R; Sponsor’s Guide and Inprocessing Checklist), which must be completed and placed in unit files. The recruiter has the primary responsibility for the reservist’s transition from the recruiting station to the unit. The recruiter is required to escort the reservist to the unit, and confirmation of the escort is the first item documented on the sponsorship checklist.

Whereas the recruiter is one of the first military members the new reservist encounters, the unit Full Time Support (FTS) personnel are usually the first members in

the unit a reservist meets. The unit administrator's responsibilities start before the member arrives to the unit. He/she should have made prior contact with the soldier, provided a welcome letter/packet, and coordinated with the First Sergeant for a sponsor. According to USARC Regulation 140-6, the member's first meeting with the unit administrator gives the soldier a "feeling of what to expect in the unit" (USARC 140-6, 1997, 7). The unit administrator welcomes the soldier, administratively inprocesses the soldier, gives the soldier the name and phone number of the sponsor, and answers any immediate questions the soldier may have.

The sponsorship program is a commander's program. The unit commander has individual sponsorship requirements, besides having responsibility for the administration of the unit's program. The commander is responsible for not only personally welcoming the soldier during the first drill, but also conducting an interview with the soldier that includes informing him¹ of the mission/organization of the unit and determining the soldier's goals and expectations of the Reserve. Additionally, the unit commander must ensure soldiers understand service obligations and participation requirements. The soldier must sign a certificate (Certificate of Acknowledgment of Service Requirements for Individuals Enlisting, Re-enlisting, or Transferring to Troop Program Units of the U.S. Army Reserve), to acknowledge receipt of the orientation (AR 135-91, 1994, 11). Finally, the commander should question the soldier to determine the effectiveness of the unit sponsorship program.

¹ Masculine pronouns in this thesis represent both the masculine and feminine genders.

The unit's first sergeant/senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) also plays an important role in the integration of the new soldier. He selects quality soldiers familiar with the unit to serve as sponsors, and trains the sponsors using the plan in USARC Pam 140-1. He also conducts a personal interview with the soldier in which he explains contract requirements, benefit and incentive plans such as the Montgomery GI Bill (education assistance), and unit standards and training requirements.

First line supervisors also have many responsibilities that impact a new soldier's first impressions of the unit. These responsibilities include contacting the soldier prior to the first drill to welcome the soldier to the unit, notifying the soldier of the drill schedule, and ensuring the soldier has no problems such as a lack of transportation that would prevent him from attending drill. Additionally, during the first drill, the first line supervisor's responsibilities include explaining the soldier's role in the section, introducing the soldier to coworkers, and explaining to the soldier what he should expect during initial entry training. The supervisor should also ensure the soldier completes inprocessing.

Although the first line supervisor has a long-term relationship with the soldier, the sponsor who is usually a peer, influences a soldier's short-term expectations of the unit. Sponsor responsibilities include contacting the soldier before the first drill to inform the soldier of what to expect at the first drill, and providing the soldier a home phone number in case he has any questions. During the first drill the sponsor escorts the soldier throughout inprocessing and shows the soldier around the unit area. The sponsor also introduces the soldier to other coworkers in the unit.

The responsibilities of key unit personnel in the sponsorship program are outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6, and require documentation on the sponsorship checklist. These responsibilities are specific, and in many cases, overlap or are redundant. The redundancies designed into the sponsorship program underscore the USARC's commitment to ensuring new soldiers form good first impressions and are properly integrated into the unit. A soldier who forms negative first impressions is more likely to decide not to participate in the Reserve.

D. PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECT RESERVE

The sponsorship program specifically identifies the responsibilities of key unit individuals regarding the integration of new reservists. This section outlines the responsibilities and participation requirements the new reservist must fulfill to remain in the select reserve. This section also details enforcement procedures for those reservists who do not fulfill contract obligations, and describes the consequences of unsatisfactory participation. Finally, enlisted loss rates, the recruiting and training costs associated with those losses, and the impact of turnover on total force readiness are presented.

1. Participation Requirements and Attendance Policies

Select Reserve participation requirements and policies are outlined in AR 140-1. They include attending all scheduled drills, annual training, and schools unless excused. In return for his attendance and participation, a reservist earns at least one day's pay and one retirement point for each unit training assembly he satisfactorily completes (AR 140-1, 1994, 8). A unit training assembly consists of at least four hours of a scheduled training assembly. Typically, a drill weekend consists of four unit training assemblies.

The unit commander has the authority to give a reservist an unexcused absence for failing to be at the scheduled time and place of training or failing to perform duties in a satisfactory (AR 140-1, 1994, 9). Unexcused absences result in the reservist losing pay and retirement points for the unexcused period. Unexcused absences are documented, and placed in the soldier's military personnel records file. The unit commander is required to send a notice of unexcused absence to a soldier who has accumulated four unexcused absences within a twelve-month period, and a notice for each unexcused absence up to and including the ninth absence. A soldier with nine unexcused absences within a twelve-month period, which began with the date of the first unexcused absence, is classified as an unsatisfactory participant.

Excused absences include sickness, injury, or other circumstances that prevented the soldier from attending required training that were beyond the soldier's control. Unit commanders may require documentation to support an absence, and will request in writing, that the soldier provide such documentation. This documentation supporting the absence must be submitted within 15 days of the commander's request, and must include proof of an incident or medical problem beyond the soldier's control (AR 135-91, 1994, 11). If a soldier fails to provide documentation of the absence, the unit commander may charge the soldier with an unexcused absence.

Unit commanders may authorize excused soldiers the opportunity to perform equivalent training in lieu of the missed scheduled training. This allows the soldier to obtain constructive attendance credit (for pay and retirement points) for scheduled training the soldier missed. The training session must be of high quality and of the same duration as the scheduled training missed, and related to the soldier's assigned duties.

Additionally, the unit commander may authorize rescheduled training, for individuals, sections, etc., for training the commander believes provides a greater training opportunity than the scheduled drill.

Although soldiers are expected to train with their assigned units, soldiers can be attached to other units for training due to an extended absence from the vicinity of the unit or a special duty requirement (AR 140-1, 1994, 9). The attachment allows the soldier to obtain constructive attendance credit for pay and retirement points.

The policies and procedures outlined above provide the unit commander flexibility to accommodate the needs of soldiers. Unit commanders, however, are required to keep detailed attendance records. Attendance records provide documentation of monthly attendance to ensure the unit meets the participation requirement of 85% of the assigned unit strength (AR140-1, 1994, 9). Failure to meet this standard alerts higher headquarters to potential personnel deployment readiness shortfalls.

2. Unsatisfactory Participation

A soldier is declared an unsatisfactory participant when he incurs nine unexcused absences from unit training assemblies within a twelve month period, or fails to attend or complete annual training (AR 135-91, 1994, 12). Failure to attend or complete annual training (AT) can result in a soldier's prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For unexcused absences, however, the unit commander initiates action against the soldier by selecting one of two options: 1) If the unit commander determines the soldier has the potential for useful service, the soldier will be transferred to the IRR; 2) If the soldier has no potential for useful service, the soldier will be discharged from the Reserve. In addition, the unit commander has the option to reduce the soldier's rank

under either option.

3. Costs of Unsatisfactory Participation

Unsatisfactory participation directly impacts limited budget dollars as well as total force readiness. USARC has determined enlisted loss rates are increasing, as illustrated in Figure 2. According to USARC Retention Office records, approximately 23% (13,711 of 61,042) of the total enlisted losses for fiscal year 1997 are due to unsatisfactory participation. Increases in losses result in higher recruiting and training costs as vacant positions must be filled with qualified soldiers. More importantly, assigned strength and duty MOS qualified shortfalls degrade unit readiness. Currently, the costs associated with recruiting and training a non-prior service soldier are \$19,432 to recruit, and \$41,568 to train for a total of \$60,000 per non-prior service soldier ("USAR Command Briefing," 1997). In addition, recruiting and retraining prior service soldiers costs \$6700 per soldier (Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, personal communication with CPT L. Frederick, October 18, 1997). In either case, the costs resulting from nonparticipation quickly consume a limited budget.

ENLISTED LOSS RATES

FY	Enlisted Strength	Losses	Percent
94	184,315	58,035	31.20%
95	171,218	57,348	32.60%
96	164,263	56,624	34.50%
97	161,371	61,042	37.80%

Figure 2. USARC Enlisted Loss Rates

The issue of force readiness is significant, as many vital support assets are located in the Reserve. Determining the causes of unsatisfactory participation and implementing

programs and procedures to reduce turnover should result in significant budget savings and an increase in total force readiness.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

To better understand the issue of unsatisfactory participation, it is useful to review relevant theoretical research to establish a framework from which to investigate the problem. Several different organizational management theories are examined to establish this framework for analysis. This chapter begins with a discussion of the broadest theories included in exchange theory research, and then narrows to the theories of psychological contracts, unmet expectations, and stages of socialization. Finally, an integrated model is introduced which will shape the design of the study of unsatisfactory participation.

B. EXCHANGE THEORY

Much research has been devoted to the study of human behavior. Three theories within the body of research known as exchange theory provide an understanding of the basic process of exchange that occurs in normal human interactions. The first, social exchange theory, explores universal human social behavior and introduces the idea that resources exchanged between individuals. The second, resource exchange, identifies categories of resources that may or may not be perceived as equal in the exchange process. The third, equity theory, examines the fairness of exchanges, the dissatisfaction that results due to perceived injustices in the exchange process, and the methods individuals employ to reduce dissatisfaction.

1. Social Exchange Theory

Homans defines elementary social behavior as the “face-to-face contact between individuals in which each receives a reward from the behavior of the other” (Homans, 1961, 7). Exchange theory is grounded in the fundamentals of economic theory and the exchanges that occur in the marketplace. Exchange theory considers human behavior as a function of its returns. An exchange will not take place unless both individuals receive something they value more than the cost for them to produce. Unlike economic theory, which primarily involves the exchange of tangible goods such as money, social exchange encompasses tangible goods, as well as intangible goods such as love. Homans demonstrates the concept of returns of behavior by noting that “men explain their behavior by pointing to what it gets them and what it costs them,” (Homans, 1961, 13). For example, an advertising executive might say that he put a lot of time and effort into developing an advertising campaign, but that it paid off because the firm won a contract with a major corporation. Social exchange, then, theorizes that society operates on the basis of human social behavior, which is motivated by gains from the exchange process.

2. Resource Exchange Theory

Whereas social exchange theory identifies that resources are exchanged between individuals, resource exchange theory examines the particular resources that are exchanged within the context of human social behavior. Foa and Foa define resource as “any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among people” (Foa & Foa, 1980, 78). Resources encompass money or physical goods, as well as less tangible items such as a service, or a pat on the back. They further maintain that “what” resources are exchanged is important to identify, and categorize all resources into

six classes to further clarify the exchange process. Figure 3 illustrates the configuration of the six resource classes.




Figure 3. Configuration of the six resource classes plotted on the axes of concreteness and particularism

The resource classes and their definitions are:

1. *Love* - an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort.
2. *Status* - an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low prestige, regard, or esteem.
3. *Information* - includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment, but excludes those behaviors which could be classified as love or status.
4. *Money* - any coin, currency, or token which has some standard unit of exchange value.
5. *Goods* - tangible products, objects, or materials.
6. *Services* - activities on the body or belongings of a person who often constitute labor for another (Foa & Foa, 1980, 80).

Each of the resource classes are aligned on the axes of concreteness and particularism. The more concrete a resource, the more the resource represents physical

goods or physical acts. The less concrete a resource is, the more symbolic, or intangible the resource is. For example, the model illustrates that goods are more concrete than status on the concrete continuum. On the particularism axis, the more particular a resource, the more one values the other individual exchanging that resource. Using money and love to illustrate this concept, it may not matter with whom we exchange money--perhaps a perfect stranger, but it does matter with whom we exchange love. The resources in the model are arranged so that resources located next to each other are more closely related. Additionally, although the model depicts specific points for each resource, the resources may overlap if more than one resource is exchanged during any interaction.

Foa & Foa tested several hypotheses to validate the model. First, although they found that each resource can be exchanged alone, it is more likely that several resources are exchanged during human interaction. Second, they determined that resources located more closely on the model are more likely to be exchanged than resources that are located further from each other on the model. Foa & Foa also determined that individuals prefer the exchange of related resources, or resources located more closely on the model. This idea of reciprocity is illustrated by a situation in which individual "A" volunteers to drive individual "B" to the airport because "B" gave "A" a ride to the airport two weeks before. "A" is attempting to ensure an even exchange of resources, and reciprocates with the same resource--a ride to the airport. If, however, "A" only gives "B" a handshake for the ride to the airport, "B" may be dissatisfied with the exchange. The second part of this example illustrates that if resources from classes located further from each other on the model are exchanged, it is likely that one or both individuals will be dissatisfied.

Exchanges during human interactions occur continuously. Individuals exchange resources to gain a resource they value relative to the cost of the resource they are offering in exchange. Foa & Foa classified resources into categories, and theorized that all resources are not equal. Exchanges that are unequal may result in tension and dissatisfaction in the exchange process.

3. Equity Theory

The issue of unequal exchange is addressed in equity theory. The discussion of equity theory addresses a third party in the exchange to illustrate a comparison situation between individuals in an organizational setting.

Adams defines equity as a balance, or equality, between the ratio of an individual's inputs and outputs as compared to someone with similar inputs in a similar situation (Adams, 1965, 280). Inputs are an individual's perceived contributions/investment in an exchange. Examples of inputs include an individual's education, experience, intelligence, etc. Outputs are the rewards an individual receives from an exchange. Examples of outputs include pay, promotion, responsibility, etc. The ratio of inputs and outputs, and equity can be graphically portrayed as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Outputs of "A" (rewards)}}{\text{Inputs of "A" (contributions)}} = \frac{\text{Outputs of "B" (rewards)}}{\text{Inputs of "B" (contributions)}}$$

Adams states that regardless of the parties involved in the exchange process, each has his own expectations of what constitutes a fair exchange (Adams, 1965, 276).

Additionally, individuals strive to achieve equity and fairness in the exchange process.

Inequity results when "A" perceives that "B" has a greater output-input ratio. For instance, "B" might get a pay raise that "A" does not receive. If "A" perceives that "B"

has the same inputs, but “B” received the raise, “A” would judge the situation as unfair. This perceived inequity results in “A” feeling tension, and being dissatisfied. In response, “A” will seek to achieve equity, or to reduce inequity in an attempt to reduce tension and dissatisfaction (Adams, 1965, 283).

Adams further identifies five methods “A” may employ to remedy the perceived inequity. The three specific options that “A” can use to correct the inequity that are relative to this study are changing the inputs, changing the outputs, or leaving the situation.

If “A” perceives that the major cause of inequity is due to a difference between his inputs and “B’s” inputs, “A” may change simply his inputs. For example, “A” may either increase or decrease his work productivity, depending on which option will minimize his contributions and maximize his rewards. “A,” however, must be able to change his inputs. For instance, “A” can alter his productivity, but may not be able to change his education level, except over time.

Instead of changing inputs, “A” might attempt to change his outputs (rewards). For example, “A” may make an appointment with his boss to ask for a raise. It may prove difficult, however, to change outputs. Whereas “A” may have some control over changing his inputs, “A” may have little control over changing his outputs.

Finally, if “A” is unsuccessful in regaining equity, “A” may decide to leave the situation. This method, according to Adams, is a “radical means of coping with inequity,” and is more likely employed when the differences of perceived inequity are greatest and other means to reduce inequity are unsuccessful (Adams, 1965, 292). In response to the inequity, “A’s” absenteeism from work may increase, he may ask for a

transfer, or, as a last resort, he may quit his job.

C. INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Exchange and equity theory research provides the general framework for the introduction and development of an integrated model. The model integrates psychological contracts and met expectation theory, realistic job preview research, and stages of socialization into a specific framework which will be used to understand the process of turnover in the Army Reserve.

1. Psychological Contracts and Met Expectation Theory

Just as an individual engaged in an exchange process has preconceived expectations of a fair exchange, a newcomer has expectations of fair exchange when joining an organization. These expectations can be thought of as a psychological contract between the newcomer and the organization. The psychological contract is continuously revised over time as a newcomer's expectations approach reality. When a newcomer and/or an organization cannot resolve unmet expectations, the newcomer may "break" the contract and leave the organization. Understanding the role of the psychological contract, and the results of unmet expectations as they apply to the joining process, can help managers prevent turnover.

Kotter defines the psychological contract as "an implicit contract between an individual and his organization which specifies what each expects to give and receive from each other in their relationship," (Kotter, 1973, 92). The newcomer may expect to receive a certain salary, advancement opportunities, challenging work, etc. In return, he expects to give his time, technical skills, commitment, etc. Rousseau further develops the concept and defines the psychological contract as an "individual's beliefs in a reciprocal

obligation between the individual and the organization,” and that organization only provides the context for the creation of the contract (Rousseau, 1989, 121). The psychological contract is based completely on the newcomer’s expectations about an organization’s obligations, and if not discussed, may be unknown to the organization.

Factors that influence the formation of psychological contracts may be explicit or implied (Rousseau, 1989, 124). For example, an organization may explicitly promise a certain salary, and the newcomer will expect to receive the salary promised. Similarly an organization may be known for the excellent pay provided it’s employees. Although just implied, the newcomer may expect to be paid well for his contributions.

Problems occur when a newcomer’s expectations of the organization are unrealistic. To the newcomer, unmet expectations equate to the failure of the organization to fulfill its obligations, and are a violation of the psychological contract. In their concept of met expectation theory, Porter and Steers hypothesized that if a newcomer encounters more unmet expectations than met expectations, the newcomer will become dissatisfied (Porter & Steers, 1968). Unlike the dissatisfaction resulting from unfair exchanges identified in equity theory, a violation of the psychological contract is a violation of trust a newcomer perceived to have been established with the organization (Rousseau, 1989, 127). The degree of the dissatisfaction resulting from unmet expectations and broken trust is likely to result in the newcomer leaving the organization. Research by Wanous, Poland, Premack, and Davis confirms that met expectations positively correlate with job satisfaction and turnover (Wanous et. al, 1992, 288).

2. Realistic Job Previews

The realistic job preview is one method that is used to bring a newcomer's expectations into congruence with organizational reality. The realistic job preview is an organizational strategy used to increase the amount and accuracy of information a newcomer receives about an organization to encourage him to develop more realistic expectations (Wanous, 1977, 601). Traditional job previews, in contrast, portray the organization as favorably as possible to attract the most qualified applicants. Recruiting literature, for example, may depict the organization as an exciting place to work. These traditional job previews can foster the development of unrealistic expectations and may result in unmet expectations, a violation of the psychological contract, and turnover. Realistic job previews give applicants a "vaccination" to deflate newcomer expectations and provide a "small dose of organizational reality" (Jablin, 1987, 688). Providing a more realistic preview of the job and the organization may increase the number of met expectations, which may translate into increased job satisfaction.

3. Stages of Socialization

The previous two sections address theories and research that relate to joining an organization. Joining an organization, however, entails a developmental process which will now be discussed.

Jablin proposes three stages of socialization—entry, assimilation, and exit. These stages are characterized by the communication processes that occur in each phase of development (Jablin, 1987, 679). In the entry stage, newcomers initially gather information about a job and an organization through sources such as family, friends, and the media. This process, defined by Jablin as vocational organizational communications

socialization (VOCS), may provide the foundation for a newcomer's formation of first impressions and expectations about an organization. During the anticipatory socialization phase, newcomers continue to acquire information from organizational recruiters, other applicants, current employees, etc. These sources may or may not provide an accurate job preview for the newcomer, and may result in a newcomer developing distorted expectations. These distorted expectations may ultimately make the assimilation process more difficult for the newcomer (Jablin, 1987, 693).

Organizational assimilation, the second stage of socialization, is divided into the phases of encounter and metamorphosis. In the encounter phase, the newcomer learns his role, and organizational norms and expectations from his supervisor and coworkers. It is in this phase that the newcomer may experience surprise (Louis, 1980), or unmet expectations, which may prove difficult for a newcomer with inflated expectations (Jablin, 1987, 695). The metamorphosis phase of the assimilation stage marks the newcomer's alignment of expectations to those of the organization. In this phase the newcomer desires to be identified with the organization, and has internalized organizational values and behaviors. Whereas the newcomer only received information in previous phases, the newcomer now provides input and feedback to supervisors and coworkers in the organization.

Jablin identifies his final stage of socialization as the exit from the organization. Reasons individuals leave organizations may include personal issues, issues which may relate to some aspect of the organization, or both. He notes, however, that research in this area is necessary in order to recognize and remedy dissatisfaction before it results in turnover (Jablin, 1987, 724).

4. Model

Combining the concepts of the stages of socialization and the psychological contract results in an integrated, conceptual model illustrated in Figure 4. Jablin only identifies three stages of socialization, but discusses other phases that fall under the umbrella of each stage. The integrated model incorporates Jablin's concepts of socialization, but reorganizes the organizational context of the model into four distinct phases. Additionally, unlike Jablin's model, the integrated model characterizes organizational exit as an outcome resulting from dissatisfaction, rather than a stage of socialization. As applied to the context of the Reserve, this change identifies that the reservist can exit during any stage of socialization. This integrated model will be applied to the context of the Army Reserve, and will be used to study turnover and the problem of nonparticipation.




Figure 4. Integrated model as adapted from Jablin and Barrios-Choplin

The integrated model consists of four stages, which include anticipatory socialization, encounter, metamorphosis, and assimilation. Each stage incorporates a phase of psychological contract development and sources of information which contribute to the formation of newcomer expectations. In the model, the newcomer to the Army Reserve may exit in any stage of the socialization process, and may also re-enter the process.

The first stage is anticipatory socialization. In this stage the individual forms his initial expectations through interactions with recruiters, other applicants, and possibly peers who are members of the Reserve. After an individual is determined to be eligible to join the Reserve, a recruiter provides the individual information about the military, the Reserve, and the jobs available. Individuals whose initial expectations are not met (a particular job is not available, for example) simply do not join, or may decide to join at a later date. Those individuals who perceive the information from the recruiter to be positive (meeting initial expectations formed through Jablin's VOCS, receiving a realistic job preview, etc.) decide to join the Reserve. The recruiter may have told the recruit that he could have a particular job, or the recruit may have only perceived that the recruiter promised him a particular job. Regardless, the recruit creates a psychological contract of expectations based on the perceived agreements with the recruiter. Between the time the recruit joins and the time he reports to the unit, he continues to seek and process information which contributes to his expectations and psychological contract.

The encounter stage occurs during the recruit's first training weekend. In the encounter stage, the recruit reports to his assigned unit. He begins to evaluate the psychological contract based on interactions with leaders and coworkers, and policies,

standards, training, etc. In this stage, the new reservist may experience surprise (unmet expectations) if reality is not correctly anticipated. As Jablin and Wanous noted, the more inflated the expectations, the more difficult this stage will be for the new reservist. If the new reservist cannot adjust his expectations to the realities of the unit, he may feel his psychological contract has been violated, experience extreme dissatisfaction, and finally, leave the organization. His dissatisfaction may be manifested through missing drills and becoming "U'd" out, failing to re-enlist, retiring, etc. Additionally, if his performance suffers as a result of his dissatisfaction, the Army may take initiatives, such as a discharge, to separate the new reservist. A feedback loop indicates that the new reservist, if eligible, may re-enter the process. If the new reservist's psychological contract is met, or he can adjust his expectations to those of the unit, he moves into the metamorphosis stage.

In the metamorphosis stage, the new reservist seeks to be accepted as a member of the unit. This requires contract revision as he adjusts his expectations to those which reflect the attitudes and behaviors expected from members of the unit. As he further develops his role in the unit, he forms new expectations. For example, he may perceive he should receive a reward (a medal) for tasks he has successfully performed over time. If the revised psychological contract of new expectations is not met, the new reservist may decide to exit the unit. Again, if eligible, the new reservist may re-enter the process in the entry and encounter stage. The revision process is cyclic, and the new reservist is continually updating and evaluating his psychological contract.

The final stage is assimilation. During this stage, the reservist is fully accepted into the unit. His revised psychological contract has been fulfilled. He has internalized

the expected behaviors and attitudes of the unit, and the unit has accepted him as a member. Through the contract revision process, he has been able to adjust his expectations to match reality. He also experiences job satisfaction, which may be manifested through good job performance, or his decision to re-enlist.

The integrated conceptual model represents the socialization process as it applies to the Army Reserve. The model, as well as the theories studied to develop the model, guides the research of the problem of unsatisfactory participation. The methodology of the study is detailed in the next chapter.

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter details the design of the study, which is based on the integrated conceptual model developed from relevant organizational management theories introduced in the previous chapter. The model is designed specifically to increase understanding of the process in which a new reservist enters and is assimilated into an Army Reserve unit. The model will be used to study the circumstances and reasons which result in reservists becoming unsatisfactory participants. Understanding why reservists leave the military may enable Army leadership to identify policies and procedures which may reduce currently unacceptable high turnover rates. The first section of this chapter will detail the design of the study and the second section will describe the data analysis tools used to examine the data.

B. DESIGN OF THE STUDY

1. Interview Protocol

Previous research on the subject of turnover and nonparticipation has focused on archival data, or used large samples for a quantitative approach to the problem. Existing research revealed that no one has collected large amounts of data from interviews with unsatisfactory participants. In this study, an interview protocol was used to obtain more qualitative data from the reservists in the sample. In addition, the interview protocol consisted of mostly open-ended questions, which allowed for probing and capturing more detailed answers from the participants. These "grass-roots" interviews of organizational dropouts may guide policy decisions at all levels.

2. Measures

The interview protocol was tested for face validity with phone interviews collected from ten nonparticipants. It was revised and shown to ten company commanders and ten first sergeants in the Reserve for a further validity check. It was then revised a second time. The interview protocol employed in the study is in Appendix A.

Items were selected for inclusion in the interview protocol based on the integrated model. Part I includes general demographic information about the respondents. The questions in Part II correspond to the anticipatory socialization stage of the model, and characterize the reservist's creation of his psychological contract. This section includes questions such as: "Where did you learn about your unit?" and "How accurate was that information?". These questions provide data on the sources of information a reservist used to initially form expectations of the Reserve and the unit before he actually reports to the unit. Part III corresponds to the encounter stage of the model. The encounter stage occurs during a reservist's first training weekend, and includes questions such as: "Did you get an orientation brief?" and "Did they appoint a sponsor to help you?". These questions provide data on the reservist's first impressions of the unit, the leadership, the people, etc., and how well the unit begins to integrate the reservist. The data also provides information on the reservist's first evaluation of his psychological contract. Part IV corresponds to the metamorphosis stage of the model, and includes questions such as: "After you joined, did things go as you expected?" and "Did you talk about your dissatisfaction with anyone in the chain of command?" Data collected from these questions provides information on the reservist's met and unmet expectations, as well as

information on whether the reservist formally attempted to improve his situation. Part V of the interview protocol reveals information on the reservist's exit from the unit, and includes questions such as: "What was your main reason for stopping attendance?" and "What, if anything, would get you to rejoin an Army Reserve unit?". These questions provide data which reveal the reason a dissatisfied reservist exits the unit. Based on the conceptual model, when a reservist exits the unit, he experiences unmet expectations, and perceives he cannot revise his contract. The data also provides insight into what policies and/or procedures the Army Reserve can implement to influence dissatisfied reservists to rejoin. The assimilation stage of the model is not addressed in this thesis, as only unsatisfactory participants, who never were assimilated, were interviewed.

3. Sampling Procedure

The sampling frame was a subset of the population of unsatisfactory participants chosen from a list provided by the USARC. The list contained the names of approximately 1120 unsatisfactory participants from the Inactive Ready Reserve database collected during fiscal year 1996. A table of random numbers was used to generate the sampling procedure. The first random number selected was seven. The seventh person, and every seventh person on the list thereafter, was called.

4. Data Collection

Approximately every second reservist called generated a recall. If the call resulted in a number which was no longer in service, or did not belong to the nonparticipant, the name was crossed off the list. An average of ten calls were necessary to generate an interview. Therefore, approximately 1000 calls were made to obtain 100 interviews. Once contact was made, the interview was conducted using the interview protocol, and

lasted an average of 20 minutes.

After obtaining 100 interviews, a coding system was developed for each question. To test the reliability of the coding system, the primary researcher and an independent coder each coded a subsample, and achieved 91% inter-coder reliability. Using the coding system, the primary researcher coded each question on the interview protocol. The code sheet and the code book are in Appendices B and C, respectively.

C. DATA ANALYSIS

After the data were coded, they were entered into Excel. Both Excel and Minitab, another statistical analysis tool, were selected to perform analysis of the data. Specific statistics and graphics commands from Minitab and Excel were chosen to manipulate and display the data. These tests included frequencies and cross tabulations. The results of the analysis are presented in the next chapter.

IV. RESULTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter IV detailed the methodology used to collect information from the 100 respondents, as well as the software used to analyze the data. This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. The integrated model provides the framework with which to organize the results. The subsections of the chapter include anticipatory socialization, encounter, metamorphosis, and exit. The subsidiary research questions, also organized using the integrated model, are addressed in the corresponding stage of the model. It should be noted that not all of the numbers, which represent responses, will equal 100% due to missing, or insignificant data.

B. ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION

The anticipatory socialization stage of the model is characterized by the reservist receiving information from sources which form first impressions and expectations of the Reserve. Jablin identifies the process by which individuals receive information prior to making first contact with anyone in an organization as vocational organizational communication (VOCS). Sources of information which contribute to VOCS include the media, promotional literature, family, friends, etc. Once the reservist visits a recruiter, the first contact with individuals associated with the Reserve is made. All of these sources of information contribute to the creation of his psychological contract, or expectations of the Reserve. The research questions in this stage explore the sources of information about the Reserve and the unit, and examine the role the recruiter plays in socializing the reservist.

1. What are the sources of information about the Army

Reserve Program, and are they accurate?

As illustrated in Figure 5, 22% of the respondents reported they received information from in-service recruiters (ISRs), and 41% reported they received information from local recruiters. Additionally, reservists received 20% of their information from either friends or relatives.




Figure 5. Sources of information about the Reserve Program

Figure 6 portrays that 47% and 21% reported that their source of information was accurate and somewhat accurate, while 21% reported their source as inaccurate. One reservist who reported he received inaccurate information responded, "I was told I would get an enlistment bonus, but never got it."




Figure 6. Accuracy of source of information about the Reserve Program

A cross tabulation of the 'sources of information' and the 'accuracy of information' in Figure 7 revealed that 13 out of 22 (59%) reservists whose source was an in-service recruiter received accurate information, 4 of the 22 received somewhat accurate information, and 4 of the 22 received inaccurate information. Most notably, while 19 of 41 (46%), and 7 of 41 (17%) of reservists whose source was a recruiter received accurate and somewhat accurate information, 13 of 41 (32%) received inaccurate information. Of the 20% who received information from family and friends, all reported the information was accurate, or somewhat accurate.

Source	ISR	Recruiter	Media	Friend	Family	Don't Recall	Other	No Prior Knowledge	Total
Accuracy									
Yes	13	19	2	8	3	0	2	0	47
No	4	13	3	0	0	0	1	0	21
Somewhat	4	7	2	2	4	0	2	0	21
Didn't get much info	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	6
Info missing	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	5
Total	22	41	8	10	10	2	6	1	100

Figure 7. Cross tabulation of source and accuracy

2. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are they accurate?

As depicted in Figure 8, the majority of reservists learned about their Reserve unit from a local recruiter (39%), whereas only 3% learned about their unit from an in-service recruiter. In contrast to the high number who learned about the Reserve program from a friend or relative, only 9% learned about their unit from these sources. A significant number of reservists (28%) received no prior information about their unit from any source.




Figure 8. Sources of information about the Reserve unit

Figure 9 illustrates that 41% of reservists reported sources of information about their units were accurate, or somewhat accurate, while 9% reported their sources were inaccurate.




Figure 9. Accuracy of source about the Reserve unit

A cross tabulation of the 'source of information about a unit' and the 'accuracy of the source' in Figure 10 illustrates that 20 of 39 (51%) reported that the recruiter gave them accurate, or somewhat accurate, information as opposed to 6 of 39 (15%) who reported receiving inaccurate information.

Source	ISR	Recruiter	Media	Civ.friend/relative	Mil. friend/relative	Don't Recall	Unit	Other	Info missing	Total
Accuracy										
Yes	3	13	0	4	1	0	2	7	0	30
No	0	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	9
Somewhat	0	7	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	11
Didn't get much info	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	13
Info missing	0	5	0	0	0	27	0	3	2	37
Total	3	39	0	8	1	28	3	16	2	100

Figure 10. Cross tabulation of source of information about the unit and the accuracy of the source

3. What is the role of the recruiter in anticipatory socialization?

Two questions from the interview protocol were used to determine the role of the recruiter in the anticipatory socialization phase:

4a. Did the recruiter take you to the unit? .

Of the 77 reservists who were accessed by a recruiter, 61% (47 of 77) were escorted by a recruiter to their new units, and 38% (29 of 77) were not. One prior service reservist reported, "I went down to the unit on my own."

4b. Did the recruiter tell you about the unit's mission?

Only 28 of 77 (36%) reported that the recruiter explained the mission of the unit to them, while 40 of 77 (52%) reported the recruiter did not.

A cross tabulation of these variables reveals that 31% (24 of 77) of the recruiters explained the mission to reservists and escorted them to their units, while 29% (22 of 77) did neither.

Tell Mission	Yes	No	Somewhat	Don't Recall	N/A/ Info missing	Total
Take to Unit						
Yes	24	4	0	0	0	28
No	18	22	0	0	0	40
Somewhat	3	3	0	0	0	6
Don't Recall	2	0	0	1	0	3
Info missing	0	0	0	0	23	23
Total	47	29	0	1	23	100

Figure 11. Cross tabulation of the variables 'did the recruiter tell you the mission of the unit' and 'did the recruiter take you to the unit'

C. ENCOUNTER

The encounter stage of the model begins when the reservist reports to his unit for the first time, and continues through the first training weekend. If the reservist's experiences in the unit do not meet his expectations, he may experience surprise (unmet expectations). During the anticipatory socialization stage, the reservist creates his psychological contract from his interactions with a recruiter, other applicants, etc. In the encounter stage, the reservist evaluates his contract against those expectations for the first

time.

1. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter stage?

Response frequencies conducted on specific questions indicate how well the unit integrated the reservist. Questions on the interview protocol that address integration of the reservist include:

6. On your first training weekend:

a. Was the unit expecting you?

Of the 100 respondents, 69% of the reservists indicated the unit was expecting them, and 18% indicated the unit was not.

b. Did you get an orientation brief?

Although 60% reported they received an orientation brief, 30% reported they did not receive one.

c. Did the commander talk to newcomers?

The commander of the unit spoke to 62% of the new reservists, but did not speak to 28%.

d. Did the unit appoint a sponsor to help you?

Sponsors were assigned to 58% of the reservists, however, 32% did not receive one.

d(1). Did the sponsor do a good job?

Of the 58 reservists who received sponsors, 52% (30 of 58) reported the sponsor did a good job in processing and assisting them, 16% reported the sponsor did a somewhat good job, while 22% (13 of 58) reported the sponsor did not do a good job.

e. Did you get inprocessed?

Finally, 71% of the reservists were inprocessed within the first two drill weekends they attended, and only 4% were never fully inprocessed. A small number of reservists (8%) indicated that although they were inprocessed before they exited the unit, the process took more than two drill weekends to complete. One reservist who did not receive uniforms when he was inprocessed reported, "I couldn't go to formations because I didn't have uniforms."

Cross tabulations of these questions provide more detailed information about the quality of a unit's integration plan. As depicted in Figure 12, only 50% of the reservists reported that both the commander talked to them and that they received an orientation brief, while 18% reported that they received neither. Eleven percent of reservists talked to the commander, but did not receive an orientation brief, and 9% received an orientation brief, but did not talk to the commander.

Orientation Brief	Yes	No	Don't Recall	Don't Know	N/A/ Info missing	Total
Commander Talk						
Yes	50	11	1	0	0	62
No	9	18	1	0	0	28
Don't Recall	0	1	0	0	0	1
Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0	0
Someone else did	1	0	0	0	0	1
N/A/Info missing	0	0	0	0	8	8
Total	60	30	2	0	8	100

Figure 12. Cross tabulation of the variables 'did you receive an orientation brief' and 'did the commander talk to newcomers'

The cross tabulation in Figure 13 illustrates that of the 69 reservists that reported the unit was expecting them, 45 of those reservists (65%) received a sponsor. Although the unit expected the arrival of 22% of reservists, none were assigned sponsors.

Source	ISR	Recruiter	Media	Civ. friend/relative	Mil. friend/relative	Don't Recall	Unit	Other	Info missing	Total
Accuracy										
Yes	3	13	0	4	1	0	2	7	0	30
No	0	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	9
Somewhat	0	7	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	11
Didn't get much info	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	13
Info missing	0	5	0	0	0	27	0	3	2	37
Total	3	39	0	8	1	28	3	16	2	100

Figure 13. Cross tabulation of the variables 'unit expecting' and 'sponsor'

Finally, of the 58 reservists who received a sponsor, only 50% (29 of 58) thought the sponsor did a good job, while 22% (13 of 58) thought the sponsor did a poor job. One reservist who did not receive a sponsor reported that he "didn't feel like part of the unit."

2. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the encounter stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?

To characterize the nature of met and unmet expectations in a specific stage, cross tabulations of certain variables were conducted to identify what met and unmet expectations occurred in each stage. Response frequencies of these questions provided information about the reservists' met and unmet expectations. The questions from the interview protocol which address met and unmet expectations and can be identified as occurring in a particular stage include:

7b(1). If something was better than you expected, what was better?

As shown in Figure 14, almost half (49%) of the respondents reported that they experienced something that was better than they expected. Of those 49 reservists, 25 noticed that something was better during the encounter stage. Forty-four percent (11 of 25) noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they expected. Less significantly,

16% (4 of 25) reported that the leadership was better than they expected, and 12% (3 of 25) reported that other benefits and opportunities (promotion, increased responsibility, etc.) were better. Only one reservist reported that nothing was better than what he expected. A reservist reported that the officers in his chain of command, “treated me like a human being instead of a rank.”




Figure 14. Frequency of 'what was better than expected' for reservists during the encounter stage.

c(1) If something was worse than what you expected, what was worse?

Ninety-two respondents reported that something was worse than they expected. As illustrated in Figure 15, 42 noticed something was worse than expected during the first drill. When asked what was worse, 29% (12 of 42) answered leadership and 21% (9 of 42) answered training. As one reservist reported, “all we did was sit there and read the paper all day—we didn’t accomplish anything.” Ten percent (4 of 42) reservists responded that inprocessing was slow/inefficient, and another 10% answered that unit enforcement standards were too low.




Figure 15. Frequency of 'what was worse than expected' for reservists during the encounter stage

9a. What was your main reason for stopping?

As illustrated in Figure 16, 11 reservists exited during the encounter stage. Of the 11 reservists, 36% (4 of 11) stopped participating because of the lack of meaningful training. One reservist reported that the unit did not seem to have a training plan, and as a result, “time was slow and monotonous at drill.” Two exited due to poor leadership treatment/skills. Another reservist reported that instead of being officially notified of his promotion by someone in the chain of command, “I found out I was promoted on my LES (Leave and Earnings Statement).” Finally, two reservists exited because of transportation problems.




Figure 16. Frequency of 'why did you stop exit/stop participating' during the encounter stage

A cross tabulation of the variables 'what was worse than you expected' and 'why did you stop participating' provides information as to whether unmet expectations relate to reasons reservists exit during the encounter stage. As illustrated in Figure 17, 2 of the 11 reservists who exited during the encounter stage noted that training was worse than they expected, and then identified training as the reason they exited the unit. Similarly, 1 of the 11 reservists noted that leadership was worse than he expected, and also identified leadership as the reason he exited the unit. Two reservists reported that the atmosphere was unchallenging, with one exiting because of leadership and the other exiting due to training.

What Worse	Leadership	Training	Atmosphere Unchallenging	Enforcement Stds Too Low	Atmosphere Too Challenging	Total
Why Stop						
Conflict Job/School	1	0	0	0	0	1
Leadership	1	0	1	0	0	2
Training	1	2	1	0	0	4
Transportation	0	1	0	0	1	2
Gen'l Dissatisfaction	0	0	0	1	0	1
Money Problems	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	4	3	2	1	1	11

Figure 17. Cross tabulation of the variables ' what was worse than you expected' and 'why did you exit/stop participating'

3. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?

Of the 100 respondents, 11 left before the second drill. A cross tabulation of the variables 'when did you stop' and 'did you talk to the chain of command about your dissatisfaction' revealed that 64% (7 of 11) talked to someone about their dissatisfaction, while the other 4 reservists did not. Figure 18 identifies who in the chain of command the reservist talked to about his dissatisfaction. Of the 7 reservists who left in the encounter stage and talked to someone, 3 (43%) spoke to the first sergeant (1SG), followed by 2 (29%) who spoke to either the unit administrator or unit administrative personnel.




Figure 18. Frequency of 'who did you talk to in the chain of command' for reservists who exited during the encounter stage

The response frequency of the variable 'what did leadership do' revealed that the way leadership in the units handled the reservists was almost evenly distributed. For 2 of the 7 (29%) reservists, leadership took a specific action to rectify the problem. For example, the commander excused one of the reservist's unexcused absences. For another 2 (29%) reservists, leadership indicated that they would be transferred/discharged without a penalty. Still another 2 reservists reported that leadership did not do anything to resolve the dissatisfaction, and 1 reservist reported that leadership ignored his dissatisfaction, or "gave me the brush-off."




Figure 19. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command (COC) do' for reservists who exited during the encounter stage

D. METAMORPHOSIS

The encounter stage transitions to the metamorphosis stage after the reservist's first drill, and continues until the reservist is assimilated into the unit. The length of the metamorphosis stage differs for every reservist, and is a function of how well and how fast the reservist can revise his unmet expectations to conform to the norms and realities of the unit.

1. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?

Similar to the organization of the encounter subsection, this section answers the same questions from the interview protocol in order to characterize met and unmet expectations in the metamorphosis stage.

7b(1) If something was better than you expected, what was better?

Of the 49 reservists who reported something was better than they expected, 13 of the 49 (29%) noticed something was better during the metamorphosis stage. As illustrated in Figure 20, the reservists in the metamorphosis stage noted the same things that the reservists in the encounter stage noted. Of the 13 reservists who noticed something was better during the metamorphosis stage, 2 (15%) reservists noticed the people were friendlier. One reservist reported that he was surprised by the great “esprit de corps” in his new unit. Two reservists noticed that the leadership was better, 2 reservists noticed other benefits/opportunities were better, and 2 reservists noticed the training was better than expected.




Figure 20. Frequency of 'what was better than expected' for reservists during the metamorphosis stage

7c(1) If something was worse than you expected, what was worse?

Of the 92 respondents that noticed something was worse than they expected, 34 reservists noticed something was worse than expected during the metamorphosis stage. As shown in Figure 21, 9 of the 34 (26%) reservists noticed the training was worse, 6 (18%) noticed

the administrative processing in the unit was worse, and 5 (15%) noticed the leadership was worse. One reservist reported that he felt he was “just a number on a strength chart,” and that the leadership “didn’t seem to care.”




Figure 21. Frequency of 'what was worse than expected' for reservists during the metamorphosis stage

9a. What was your main reason for stopping?

As depicted in Figure 22, 85 reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage. Of the 85 reservists, 15 (18%) stopped participating because of poor training, 13 (15%) stopped participating due to a conflict with either a job or school, and 13 (15%) stopped participating due to poor leadership. A reservist reported that there was such a lack of leadership discipline in his unit that, “everyone called each other by their first names,” and that the practice was acceptable in his unit.




Figure 22. Frequency of 'why did you exit/stop participating during the metamorphosis stage

Just as in the encounter section, a cross tabulation of the variables 'what was worse than you expected' and 'why did you stop participating' provides insight as to whether unmet expectations relate to reasons reservists exit during the metamorphosis stage. Although 85 reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage, Figure 23 only illustrates the most relevant information from the cross tabulation. As depicted in the bold, italicized numbers in Figure 23, 29% (25 of 85) exited as a result of an unmet expectation.

Why Stop	Unfair		Conflict		Not Given			Gen'l		Indiv. In		Total
	Policy	Job/School	Ldrshp	Tng	School/MOS	Trans	Processing	Dissat.	COC	Money		
What Worse												
Ldrshp	1	2	7	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	15	
Tng	2	3	2	4	2	1	1	1	0	1	17	
Not Given School/MOS	1	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	6	
Trans	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	
Processing	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	7	
Gen'l Dissat.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	
Hrs/Work Schedule	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	
Stds. Low	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	
Indiv. In COC	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	
Money	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	
Nothing Worse	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	5	
Total	6	11	11	14	7	7	2	6	1	5	70	

Figure 23. Cross tabulation of 'what was worse than expected' and 'why did you stop participating' for the metamorphosis stage

2. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?

As discussed, 85 of the respondents left during the metamorphosis stage. A cross tabulation of the variables 'when did you stop' and 'did you talk to the chain of command about your dissatisfaction' revealed that 59 (69%) reservists talked to someone in the chain of command about their dissatisfaction, and 24 reservists did not. One soldier who talked to the first sergeant about his dissatisfaction said "he told me he'd talk to someone and get back to me—but he never did." Figure 24 identifies who in the chain of command the reservists' talked to about their dissatisfaction. Of the 59 reservists who spoke to someone, 13 (22%) spoke to their platoon sergeant. One reservist who talked to his platoon sergeant, however, noted that "he agreed with me, but I don't think it went above him." Eleven (19%) reservists spoke to the first sergeant (1SG), and 10 (17%)

spoke to the commander.




Figure 24. Frequency of 'who did you talk to' for reservists who exited during the metamorphosis stage

A frequency test of the variable 'what did leadership do' in Figure 25 revealed the manner in which leadership handled the reservists who left the unit. Of the 59 reservists who spoke to someone, 15 (25%) reported that the chain of command did nothing, while 12 (20%) reported that the chain of command said they would take a specific action to remedy the dissatisfaction. Seven reservists reported that the chain of command told them there was nothing they could do, and 4 reservists reported that the chain of command ignored them, or gave them the "brush-off."




Figure 25. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command do' for reservists who exited during the metamorphosis stage

E. EXIT

When a reservist decides to stop participating in the unit, he has made a decision to exit the select reserve system. Exiting is not a stage in the model, but is an outcome that usually results from dissatisfaction, and can occur in any stage of the model. This section provides information as to what actions the unit usually takes after a reservist exits the unit.

1. After the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?

Answers to the following questions from the interview protocol will provide information to answer this question.

11a. After you stopped attending, did anyone personally try to get you to return?

A frequency test for this question showed that 41% of the reservists reported that someone did try to get them to return to the unit. Fifty-nine percent, however, reported that no one attempted to get them to return. A reservist who was not personally contacted

reported that the chain of command, “didn’t even know I wasn’t going—I guess they didn’t even care.” Another reservist who was only sent form letters advised leadership to “find out what the problem is and help the soldier resolve it—a letter just pisses the soldier off.”

11b. Who tried to get you to return?

Figure 26 illustrates that of the 41 reservists that reported someone did try to get them to return, 10 of the 41 (24%), reported that their platoon sergeant was the one who contacted them. Similarly, 8 of the 41 (20%) respondents noted that another sergeant in the chain of command contacted them. In contrast, only 4 of the 41 (10%) reported that the commander contacted them, and only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported that another officer in their chain of command contacted them. Additionally, only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported contact by the unit retention sergeant.




Figure 26. Frequency of 'who personally contacted you' after the reservist exited the unit.

11c. What did the person that contacted you say?

As illustrated in Figure 27, of the 41 reservists who were contacted by someone in their unit, 11 of the 41 (27%) noted that the person that contacted them inquired about their

situation and the reasons they had missed drill. Twenty percent (8 of 41), however, reported that the individual only quoted the rules and regulations governing missed drills. In another 10 cases (24%), the contacting person either asked the reservist, or tried to convince them, to come back and participate in the unit.




Figure 27. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command say' after contacting the reservist after he had left the unit

A cross tabulation of the variables 'who did you talk to' and 'what did they say' in Figure 28 provides more detailed information. Ironically, the individuals in the chain of command who have the authority to order a reservist to return to the unit (commander and first sergeant) did not do so. Generally, the lower the person was in the chain of command, the more likely the person was to just state the rules, or order the reservist to return.

Who Contacted	Other		Platoon		Squad	Retention	U/A or		Other/	Other		Total
	Cdr	Officer	ISG	Sgt	Ldr	NCO	Admin	NCO	Friend	Recruiter	Sgt	
What Said												
Stated Rules	0	1	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	8
Asked to Return	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
Ordered to Return	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Convinced to Return	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	5
Inquired About Sit.	0	0	1	4	0	1	1	1	0	0	3	11
Tried to Rectify Sit.	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Left Message	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
N/A/No Info	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
Never Followed Up	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Total	4	1	5	10	1	1	6	3	2	2	8	41

Figure 28. Cross tabulation of the variables 'who contacted you' and 'what did they say' for reservists who exited the unit

2. What would influence a soldier to rejoin a Reserve Unit, and is it related to the reason he exited?

The questions on the interview protocol that address this issue include:

13b. What, if anything, would get you to rejoin the Reserve?

Although 100 reservists responded, only the significant responses are depicted in Figure 29. Of the 100 respondents, 18 reported nothing would get them to rejoin. Another 8 reservists did not know, or were not sure what would get them to rejoin. Twelve reservists reported that they would rejoin if they could get a new job or a new MOS, and 7 reported they would rejoin if they could find a unit closer to home. Only 6 reservists reported they would rejoin if the pay increased. A reservist who would join if his pay increased expressed that he would work all week in his civilian job, and then “go to the Reserves for pocket change.”




Figure 29. Frequency of 'what would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve'

A cross tabulation of the variables 'what would it take to get you to rejoin' and 'why did you stop participating' provides information about whether 'what would influence a reservist to rejoin' is related to 'why he exited'. Figure 30 depicts the relevant information from the respondents. Of the 100 respondents, 74 named something that would get them to rejoin. As illustrated by the bold, italicized numbers in Figure 30, for 20% (15 of 74) of the reservists, the reason they exited the unit is directly related to the incentive they identified would get them to rejoin.

Why Stop	Unfair	Conflict	Not Given			Gen'l	Indiv. In	Total
	Policy	Job/School	Ldrshp	Tng	School/MOS	Trans	Dissat.	
Why Rejoin								
Money for Education	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
Money	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	6
Unit Closer	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	5
Would Rejoin Anyway	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Flexible Schedule	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
New Job/MOS	0	1	0	5	4	0	1	11
Increase Standards	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
New unit	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	5
Better Training	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	4
Flexible Policies	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Better Leadership	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3
Do Not Know	0	2	2	0	0	2	1	7
Nothing	3	3	2	4	2	2	0	18
Total	7	14	9	15	6	8	7	70

Figure 30. Cross tabulation of the variables 'why did you stop participating' and 'what would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve'

3. What recommendations do nonparticipants have for Army Reserve leadership to reduce nonparticipation?

Figure 31, which only depicts significant responses, illustrates that of the 100 respondents, 22 reservists recommended increasing the quality of training in the unit. One reservist wondered, "what happens when the unit gets called to war and we haven't been training?" Seventeen reservists recommended increasing leadership's interest in and care of reservists. One reservist made a suggestion aimed at improving both leadership and training when he suggested that leadership "make soldiers feel like part of a team, and feel like they're really accomplishing something." Sixteen reservists recommended that the communications channels in the unit be improved. Additionally, the response frequencies for the question 'did the quality of communications influence your leaving' resulted in 75% of reservists reporting that communications did influence, or somewhat

influence their decision to leave. Finally, 7 reservists recommended that new reservists should be informed of expectations before they report to the unit, and 4 more reservists recommended the unit do a better job of integrating new reservists into the unit. One reservist reported that "I just didn't ever feel like I was a member of the unit."




Figure 31. Frequency of 'what suggestion do you have to keep reservists participating in drills with their units'

The data presented in this chapter will be discussed in the next chapter.

Specifically, the data presented for each subsidiary research question will be analyzed and answered. These explanations will ultimately lead to the answer of the primary research question.

VI. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter V displayed the results of the data collected from the telephonic interviews. First, this chapter will provide answers to the primary and subsidiary research questions posed in Chapter I. Second, this chapter will offer recommendations to reduce the problem of nonparticipation in the Select Reserve. Finally, areas for future research will be discussed.

B. DISCUSSION

The discussion includes implications and answers to the subsidiary research questions, and finally, the answer to the primary research question. The research questions are organized according to the integrated conceptual model presented in Chapter III. As mentioned previously, the reservists included in the sample are unsatisfactory participants who have failed to fulfill Reserve contract obligations. These reservists may have attribution biases which attribute blame for their behavior to the institution or to others, rather than to themselves. Additionally, it should be recognized that some unsatisfactory participants may be poor performers, which may explain the low percentages of unit contact after the reservist exits the unit.

1. Subsidiary Research Questions

Anticipatory Socialization

a. What are the sources of information about the Army Reserve program, and are they accurate?

The primary sources of information about the Army Reserve program are local recruiters and in-service recruiters. More than half of the reservists whose source was an in-service recruiter received accurate information, and less than half of the reservists whose source was a local recruiter received accurate information. Part of this difference may be attributed to the fact that in-service recruiters access prior service soldiers, whereas most local recruiters access the majority of non-prior service soldiers. Prior service soldiers have military experience, and thus may not need as much information about the Reserve in order to form realistic expectations. In addition, the local recruiter is rewarded for accessing reservists, and may portray the Reserve more positively than reality. The resulting overly optimistic view may result in potential recruits developing unrealistic expectations of the Reserve.

b. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are they accurate?

Over a third of reservists learned about their units from local recruiters. Although only a few reservists learned about their units from in-service recruiters, all reported the information was accurate, or somewhat accurate. As discussed, the accuracy of the in-service recruiters may result from the military experience of the prior service soldiers they recruit. In contrast, more than 10% of the reservists who learned about their unit from a local recruiter reported receiving inaccurate information. Additionally, almost a third of the reservists reported they received no prior information about their unit from any source. Recruiters and other accession sources, however, are not required to brief reservists about their units. Currently, the unit is the reservist's primary source of information through orientation briefings, etc. The reservist does not receive that

information until he reports to the unit for the first time. The reservist has no opportunity to form realistic expectations of his unit, and may develop unrealistic expectations based on the generally optimistic information initially presented to persuade him to join the Reserve.

c. What is the role of the local recruiter in anticipatory socialization?

The role of the local recruiter in anticipatory socialization entails facilitating the new reservist's encounter with his new unit through escorting the reservist to the unit for his first training weekend. Although the recruiter is not required to brief the reservist on the mission of the unit, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to his unit in accordance with the sponsorship program outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6. Over three-quarters of the respondents were accessed by a local recruiter, but only a little more than half were escorted by a local recruiter to their new unit. This figure is not surprising, as the recruiter could theoretically have to escort several reservists to different units on the same day. Escorting the reservist, however, demonstrates to the reservist that the organization cares about his first impressions of the unit.

Encounter

a. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter stage?

Generally, the findings indicate room for improvement in the implementation of the sponsorship program. Although required by USARC Regulation 140-6, only approximately one-third of the reservists received an orientation briefing. Additionally, just over half of the reservists reported they received a sponsor. The assignment of a sponsor, however, is not a guarantee the sponsor performs his duties adequately. Almost

a quarter of the reservists reported the sponsor did a poor job. On a positive note, commanders spoke to almost three-quarters of the newcomers, and almost all of the reservists were inprocessed within the first two training weekends. The requirements of the sponsorship program are designed to assimilate the new reservist into the unit as quickly as possible. When these requirements are not accomplished, the reservist remains in the encounter stage longer than the first training weekend, which slows the socialization process. As the length of the socialization time increases, the soldier is more likely to be dissatisfied, and is more likely to exit because he does not feel included in the unit.

b. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the encounter stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reason for exiting during this stage?

Over half of the reservists experienced surprise (unmet expectations), both better and worse than expected, during the encounter stage. The significant number of unmet expectations indicates the reservist did not receive a realistic preview of the unit. This is not surprising, as most of the reservists received no information about the unit prior to their arrival.

The majority of reservists noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they expected, followed by a much smaller number who noticed the leadership was better than they expected. Almost a third of the reservists, however, noticed the leadership was worse than they expected, followed by almost a quarter reporting the training was worse than expected. Generally, based on the data collected, reservists tended to first judge human interactions in the unit, rather than unit policies or standards.

Almost a third of the reservists identified something worse than they expected, and then exited for the same reason. These findings suggest that the reasons reservists exit during the encounter stage may be related to unmet expectations that have not been resolved. Leaders, then, should recognize that the first drill weekend is crucial to the socialization of the new reservist. If the first drill weekend is not properly managed, unmet expectations may form the basis for decisions to exit the unit.

c. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take?

Almost three-quarters of the reservists who left during the encounter stage talked to someone about their dissatisfaction. This finding indicates the reservists signaled someone of their dissatisfaction. These signals allow leadership the opportunity to identify a dissatisfied reservist and take actions to prevent a reservist from exiting.

Almost half of the reservists spoke to the first sergeant. The first sergeant, then, has the most opportunity to identify the dissatisfaction and, if possible, take measures to prevent a soldier from eventually exiting the unit. None of the reservists spoke to the commander. Lack of involvement may indicate to the reservist that the commander is not interested enough in the reservist's activities to schedule time to talk to him.

Almost a third of the soldiers spoke to the unit administrator, or the administrative sergeant. Ironically, these individuals are not in the formal chain of command. These individuals should refer the reservist back to his formal chain of command, as they have no leadership obligation to assist the reservist with problems.

While the reservist is being inprocessed, the platoon sergeant may not spend much time with the reservist during the encounter stage. The platoon sergeant should

periodically “check-in” with the reservist to make sure the sponsor is taking care of the reservist, and that there are no problems. The platoon sergeant should also ensure the reservist knows the procedures to communicate with the chain of command.

Almost half of the reservists perceived the chain of command ignored them, or did nothing to resolve their problems. Leadership, then, must take actions to change this perception and be more receptive to dissatisfied reservists. Leadership needs to demonstrate they care and will do what they can to resolve reservists’ problems.

Finally, none of the reservists spoke to the retention sergeant, whose duties include the retention of reservists. Leadership may want to redefine the role of the retention sergeant to help in the identification of reservists at risk of exiting the unit.

Metamorphosis

a. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?

Fewer reservists in the metamorphosis stage, as compared to the encounter stage, noticed something was better or worse than they expected. This finding suggests that based on the model, some reservists were able to successfully revise some of their unmet expectations during the metamorphosis stage. As in the encounter stage, reservists primarily noticed the human interaction processes in the unit, such as the people, the leadership and the training. In addition, the reservists identified problems that were not as evident in the encounter stage. Almost 20% noticed that processing was worse than they expected. Whereas leadership can generally assume the majority of the dissatisfaction can be attributed to leadership and training issues during the encounter

stage, more long-term issues, such as policies and procedures, evolve as potential problems during the metamorphosis stage.

The majority of the reservists left during the metamorphosis stage. Over time, these reservists could not resolve their dissatisfactions and exited the unit. Approximately one third of the reservists identified something as worse than they expected, and exited because of the same unresolved dissatisfaction. Again, leadership must stress the importance of accepting and integrating the reservist, and must attempt to identify and resolve problems as early in the socialization process as possible.

b. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?

Almost three-quarters of the reservists talked to someone in the chain of command about their dissatisfactions. During the metamorphosis stage, however, the majority of the reservists talked to their platoon sergeant about their problems. Many still spoke to the first sergeant, but again, unlike the encounter stage, several spoke to the commander. The first sergeant consistently remains involved in the problem resolution process and potentially has the most influence on a reservist's decisions to exit. Now, however, the platoon sergeant and the commander are significantly involved as well. Both the commander and the platoon sergeant need to be involved in problem resolution earlier in the socialization process—during the encounter stage. These findings suggest that the reservist has developed a better understanding of the communications process in the unit, and knows how to utilize the chain of command to solve problems. Again, leaders should ensure reservists understand the communication channels and the chain of command

structure during the encounter stage.

Over half of the reservists reported the individuals they talked to about their dissatisfaction did nothing to resolve the problem, or ignored them. Additionally, almost a third of the reservists did not speak to anyone about their dissatisfaction. This finding suggests that reservists may have perceived the chain of command as being unapproachable, or perceived that the chain of command could not, or would not, resolve the problem. Leaders definitely need to keep the lines of communication open with reservists in the unit, and perhaps learn and practice counseling skills.

Exit

a. After the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?

Almost 60% of the reservists were not personally contacted by anyone in the unit. The majority of reservists who were contacted were contacted by their platoon sergeant. A reservist who has exited should be contacted by every individual in his chain of command. Many were contacted by the unit administrator/administrative sergeant, or another sergeant in the unit, and told the rules governing nonparticipation or ordered to return to the unit. This finding suggests that reservists are being contacted by sergeants who are tasked to contact them, rather than someone in their chain of command who should care that the reservist does not want to participate in the unit.

Although the first sergeant seems to have opportunities in the encounter and metamorphosis stages to influence the reservist, few reservists were personally contacted by the first sergeant after they exited the unit. Additionally, few were personally contacted by the commander. The commander and the first sergeant are missing an opportunity to influence the reservist to return to the unit. The commander and first

sergeant are figureheads, and a call from either one demonstrates they care about the reservist's decision to exit, and want him to return.

b. What would influence a reservist to rejoin a Reserve unit, and is it related to the reason he exited?

Over 80% of reservists might be influenced to rejoin a Reserve unit. The findings show major influences include a new job or a new MOS, a unit closer to home, and increased pay. Additionally, the results indicate that for almost a quarter of the reservists, the reason they would rejoin the Reserve is directly related to the reason they exited the unit. For example, some reservists stated they exited because they did not receive the school/MOS/job they desired, and would rejoin if they were given a military school, or a new MOS/job. The majority of the unsatisfactory participants have already completed initial entry training, and are MOS qualified. If the Reserve could accommodate some of these soldiers, training and recruiting dollars could be saved by keeping the soldier in the Reserve system. For example, attempting to place a reservist in a unit closer to his home, if possible, would save cost of recruiting and training another reservist.

c. What recommendations do reservists have for Army Reserve leadership to reduce nonparticipation?

Reservists' top three recommendations to reduce nonparticipation include improving the quality of training, improving the quality of leadership, and improving the quality of communications in the unit. Poor training is one of the trends which consistently emerged throughout the interview process. The findings indicate that, although a reservist may be getting paid for attending drill, he values his time and wants to learn. Developing an incentive program for good training, and placing a list of training

“best practices” on a web page, for example, may help leadership benefit from other unit’s training successes.

The second trend which consistently emerged is poor leadership. The results support that many unsatisfactory participants perceived leadership treated them unfairly, and did not care about their dissatisfaction. This finding reinforces the third recommendation—that communications be improved. Improving communications in the unit may improve reservist’s perceptions of the leadership. Managerial communications modules and counseling modules should be included in leadership training.

2. Primary Research Question

What factors influence reservists to stop participating in Select Reserve unit drills?

As discussed, many factors influence reservists to stop participating in unit drills. The findings indicate, however, that the most influential factors are training and leadership. Reservists identified unmet expectations in training and leadership in the encounter and metamorphosis stages of socialization, and many exited because of training and leadership issues. Unit leadership exacerbated these problems through little or ineffective attempts to rectify the reservist’s problems, as well as inadequate efforts to influence the reservist to return to the unit.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are presented based on the discussion in the previous section.

1. The local recruiter is the reservist’s primary source of information about the Reserve Program, however, one-third of the information reservists receive from

local recruiters is inaccurate.

2. One in three reservists received no prior information about their assigned unit.

3. A recruiter did not escort one in three reservists to his assigned unit.

4. Although required by the sponsorship program, approximately one in four reservists did not receive an orientation brief, did not meet with the commander, and was not assigned a sponsor.

5. Reservists generally noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they expected, and the training and leadership were worse than they expected.

6. Poor training was the leading reason one in four reservists exited the unit.

7. The unit first sergeant is the primary member of the chain of command the reservist speaks to about his dissatisfaction before exiting the unit.

8. The chain of command failed to resolve problems for one of four reservists.

9. The chain of command personally contacted only half of the reservist who had exited the unit.

10. If offered various incentives, 82% of the nonparticipants would rejoin the Army Reserve.

11. The leading recommendations nonparticipants have to increase participation in units are increasing the quality of training, leadership, and communications.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The leading recommendations address the major conclusions in the previous section. Implementation of these recommendations should significantly reduce the number of nonparticipants, as well as increase force readiness and reduce costs.

1. Provide new reservists realistic and accurate information during the accession process.

Providing new reservists accurate information and realistic job previews will enable them to form realistic expectations of the Reserve, and of the unit. Realistic information may reduce the number of unmet expectations, which may reduce the dissatisfaction and prevent the reservist from exiting the unit.

a. Equip accession sources to provide reservists realistic job previews so new reservists develop realistic expectations. Instead of showing training videos which depict training that is the exception rather than the norm, produce training tapes that depict a typical drill weekend for an average Reserve unit. Produce a training video that follows some new reservists through the inprocessing and integration process, and record what occurs and their responses.

b. Provide accession sources (in-service recruiters, local recruiters and MEPS) standardized fact sheets about the Reserve and specific units that can be provided to the new reservist. Reserve fact sheets may have the mission, wiring diagram, commander's philosophy and goals, etc. Unit fact sheets may include the mission of the unit, a wiring diagram, commander's philosophy, planned training highlights for the year, etc.

c. Eventually enable all units to have web pages on the Internet so accession sources can easily provide new reservists current information about the unit. The accession sources could have a computer terminal and modem with access to the Internet, and could allow new recruits to view unit homepages, as well as print a hardcopy of the information. Recognizing all units may not have the capability or expertise to construct a web page, the Reserve might consider contracting for this service.

2. Have a unit representative escort the new unit member from the accession source.

Currently, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to the unit. The findings suggest, however, that the reservist is not always escorted to the unit. Often, the recruiter is unable to escort the new reservists he is responsible for to their units due to scheduling conflicts. Having a unit representative, possibly the retention sergeant and the designated unit sponsor, report to the recruiting station and escort the new reservist will ensure the new member is escorted to the unit. Additionally, the unit should expect, and be prepared for the new reservist's arrival.

3. Develop a unit arrival schedule for new reservists.

The findings suggest that at times, coordination between the unit and the recruiter does not occur, and the unit is not expecting the arrival of the new reservist. One recommendation is to study the feasibility of only accepting newcomers every other month. A standardized arrival every other month would allow commanders to plan training around the arrival of new reservists, as well as enable them to properly plan and execute the requirements of the sponsorship program (plan and conduct orientation briefings and the commander's talk to newcomers, select and train unit sponsors, etc.).

For example, the recruiter would develop a pick-up schedule for each Reserve unit which corresponded to the units' drill dates, and a unit representative would report to the recruiting station at the designated time every other month to meet and escort newcomers assigned to their unit. With a standardized arrival, the chain of command would be available and prepared to execute the requirements of the sponsorship program. This procedure would prevent uncoordinated arrivals and sponsorship program failures, which occurred when one reservist reported to his unit on a day the unit was conducting an M16 qualification range.

4. Emphasize the importance of the sponsorship program in leadership training.

Leadership training should include the requirements of the sponsorship program, and the associated cost and readiness implications of failing to successfully implement the program. The training may include a general overview of the stages of socialization and expectation theory, as well as the results of this study. The training may also include role-playing to demonstrate to leaders the importance of successfully assimilating a new reservist into the unit.

5. The unit retention sergeant's duties should include the entire scope of the retention process, and not just re-enlistment duties.

Currently, the retention sergeant is primarily tasked with re-enlistment issues. In addition to the chain of command's efforts to contact the reservist, the retention sergeant should have a major role in assisting the commander to identify reservists who are at risk of exiting the unit. For instance, after a reservist's fifth unexcused absence, the retention sergeant should contact the reservist and try to determine the reasons the reservist is not

attending drills. The retention sergeant would then inform the commander about the reservist's dissatisfaction. If the commander determines the reservist has a problem, such as transportation, that he cannot resolve, the commander may authorize the reservist to see a recruiter or the battalion retention sergeant (someone who has access to the database of available units/positions). The recruiter may be able to find a unit that is closer to the reservist's home. The commander, however, must first exhaust all local resources to assist the reservist, and should only refer those reservists who have a legitimate issue, have a good performance record, and are worth retaining. The unit retention sergeant, therefore, becomes part of the prevention process, and assists the commander in identifying and resolving the reservist's problem.

6. Emphasize the importance of communication in leadership training

Managerial communications and counseling modules should be included in leadership training. The perceptions that leadership was unorganized or uncaring could be mitigated if the chain of command ensured the channels of communication were open—up, down, and laterally. Leadership should keep reservists informed to reduce the stress and frustration associated with not knowing what is going on. Counseling training would provide leadership the ability to be effective and empathetic listeners, and teach them skills to demonstrate caring through body language, for example.

7. Publicize and reward unit "best practices."

Recruiting Partnership Councils are scheduled at different levels in the chain of command of the USAR. These councils could be used as a forum to highlight and reward unit "best practices," including leadership, training, and sponsorship initiatives. For example, the units may be awarded extra funds to purchase training teams and modules

from the Readiness Training Center. Additionally, the "best practices" could be published on a web page, similar to the way lessons learned are published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

8. The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard should share database information about unsatisfactory participants.

An unsatisfactory participant represents a loss of training dollars to the Reserve. Sharing a database of unsatisfactory participants would allow either the Reserve or the National Guard to fill shortages with individuals who may have completed initial entry training, or are MOS qualified. For example, if a reservist does not like the Reserve, and will not rejoin the Reserve, he may be willing to join the National Guard, as some reservists indicated during the course of the interview. If the database resulted in a successful rejoin, perhaps the National Guard could pay the Reserve for the accession of the Army Reserve unsatisfactory participant, and vice-versa, as an incentive to share information. The Reserve could potentially recoup some of the money invested in training an individual. Eventually, this information pool could be expanded to include other Reserve components.

E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study focused on the factors which influence a reservist to exit a unit. Further research is necessary to identify factors which influence a reservist to continue to participate in a unit. Conducting a similar study of individuals who have decided to remain in the Reserve will provide information for the assimilation stage of the integrated model.

Additionally, further research should be conducted on participation in the National Guard and other service Reserve components to determine the strengths of their programs. By studying these programs, the best practices in each organization could be identified, and may result in increased military force readiness and budget savings.

F. FINAL CONCLUSION

The percentage of enlisted losses in the USAR is increasing. Approximately a quarter of the total enlisted losses are due to unsatisfactory participation. These losses equate to lost training dollars and decreased force readiness, as others must be recruited and trained as replacements. This study has used a methodology which involved talking to reservists, who have left their units, to discuss the reasons and timing of their decisions to depart. The study has resulted in recommendations, if implemented, may provide considerable cost savings and reduced personnel turnover due to unsatisfactory participation.

APPENDIX A. NONPARTICIPATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Army Reserve Nonparticipation Survey

My name is _____. I'm at a graduate school of management. We've been asked by the Army Reserve to talk to some reservists who stopped participating to find out the reasons, and what can be done to reduce nonparticipation. Could you take a few minutes to talk confidentially to me about your experiences?

BACKGROUND

1.
 - a. Survey identification number
 - b. Sex
 - c. Last Reserve unit
 - d. MOS in your last Reserve unit?
 - e. How many other Reserve units have you been a member of?
 - f. MOS in the other Reserve units
 - g. Active duty
 - h. Last active duty unit
 - i. MOS on active duty
 - j. Time on active duty
 - k. Time between joining and attending Reserve Initial Entry Training
 - l. Current Rank
 - m. Marital status
 - n. Children
 - o. Current age
 - p. Distance from home to last Reserve unit (in minutes)
 - p(a). Distance from home to last Reserve unit (in miles)
 - q. Civilian occupation
 - r. Highest level of education

PRE-ENTRY

2.
 - a. Where did you learn about the Army Reserve Program?
 - b. How accurate was that information?
 - c. What was different than reality?
3.
 - a. Where did you learn about your unit?
 - b. How accurate was that information?
 - c. What was different than reality?
4. Did your recruiter:
 - a. Take you to the unit?
 - b. Tell you about the unit's mission?
 - c. Give you the MOS you wanted?
 - c(1). If not, why not?
 - d. Tell the unit you were coming?
5.
 - a. Why did you join the Army Reserve?
 - b. Were your expectations met?
 - b(1). If not, why not?

ENCOUNTER

6. On your first training weekend:
 - a. Was the unit expecting you?
 - b. Did you get an orientation brief?
 - c. Did the commander talk to newcomers?
 - d. Did they appoint a sponsor to help you?
 - d(1). If so, did the sponsor do a good job?
 - e. Did you get inprocessed (pay, identification card, uniform)?

METAMORPHOSIS

7.
 - a. After you joined the unit, did things go as you expected?
 - b. Was anything better than what you expected?

- b(1). If so, what was better than you expected?
- b(2). When did you notice?
- c. Was anything worse than what you expected?
- c(1). If so, what was better than you expected?
- c(2). When did you notice?
- 8. When did you stop attending drills?
- 9. a. What was your main reason for stopping attendance at drills?
- b(1) Was there a second reason you stopped attending?
- b(2) Was there a third reason you stopped attending?
- 10. a. Did you talk about your dissatisfaction with anyone in the chain of command?
- b. If so, who did you talk to?
- c. What did the person you talked to do about your dissatisfaction?

EXIT

- 11. a. After you stopped attending, did anyone personally try to get you to return?
- b. If so, who?
- c. What did the person who contacted you say?
- d. Why didn't you return?
- 12. I'm going to ask you a couple of questions about the quality of communication in your unit. On a scale of one to five, with one being very dissatisfied, and five being very satisfied, how satisfied were you with communications with:
 - a. Your co-workers?
 - b. Your sergeants?
 - c. Your commander?
 - d. How could communications be improved in the unit?
 - e. Did the quality of communications influence your leaving?
- 13. a. Do you plan to ever rejoin an Army Reserve unit?
- a(1). If you have rejoined, why did you rejoin?
- b. What, if anything, would get you to rejoin a unit?

- c. What, if anything, do you miss about your unit?
 - d. What, if anything, don't you miss about your unit?
14. Finally, if you could offer one suggestion to the Army Reserve leadership to keep soldiers participating in drills with their units, what would it be?

Thanks for your time. Your comments have been very useful.

APPENDIX B. CODESHEET

CODE SHEET

(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)

<i>Response</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Description</i>
— — — —	1a.	Survey identification number
—	1b.	Sex: male=1, female=2
—	1c.	Last reserve unit: Combat=1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8
—	1d.	MOS: Combat=1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8
—	1e.	# of reserve units: actual number
—	1f.	Previous MOS: Combat=1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8, N/A=9
—	1g.	Active duty: yes=1, no=2
—	1h.	Last AD unit: Combat=1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8, N/A=9
—	1i.	AD MOS: Combat=1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8, N/A=9
—	1j.	Time of active duty: under 1 yr=1, 1yr to 1 yr 11 mos=2, 2yrs to 2yrs 11mos=3, 3 yrs to 3 yrs 11 mos=4, 4 yrs and greater=5, N/A=9
—	1k.	Time bet. joining and attending: direct entry=1, delayed entry=2, split option=3
—	1l.	Current rank: PV1=1, PV2=2, PV3=3, SPC=4, SGT=5, SSG=6, SFC=7
—	1m.	Marital Status: married=1, single=2
—	1n.	Children: none=1, 1 child=2, 2 children=3, 3 children=4, over 3 children=4
— —	1o.	Age: actual age

CODE SHEET (pg 2)

Response	Question	Description
—	1p.	Distance to unit in <u>miles</u> : less than 10 miles=1, 10-30 miles=2, 31-40 miles=3, 41-50 miles=4, over 51 miles=5, N/A=9
—	1p(a).	Distance to units in <u>minutes</u> : less than 15 min=1, 15-30 min=2, 31-45 min=3, 45-60 min=4, over 61 min=5, N/A=9
— —	1q.	Civilian Occupation: agriculture, forestry, fishing=1, mining=2, construction=3, manufacturing=4, trans/public utilities=5, wholesale trade=6, retail trade=7, finance, insurance, real estate=10, services=11, public admin=12, nonclassifiable establishments=13, unemployed=14, student=15, self-employed=16
—	1r.	Education: H.S. or GED=1, some college/tech =2, Associates=3, BA=4, MA=5
—	2a.	Learn about Reserve?: in-service recruiter=1, local recruiter=2, media=3, friend=4, relative=5, don't recall=6, no prior knowledge=7, 8=other
—	2b.	Info Accurate?: accurate=1, inaccurate=2, somewhat accurate=3, didn't get much info=4, don't recall=5
—	2c.	What different than reality?: EMERGE
—	3a.	Learn about unit?: in-service recruiter=1, local recruiter=2, 3=media, 4=civilian friend/relative, 5=military related/friend or relative, 6=no prior knowledge, 7=unit, 8=other
—	3b.	Info Accurate?: accurate=1, inaccurate=2, somewhat accurate=3, didn't get much info=4, don't recall=5, N/A=9
—	3c.	What different than reality?: EMERGE
—	4a.	Recruiter take to unit?: yes=1, no=2, don't recall=4, N/A=9
—	4b.	Recruiter tell mission?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3, don't recall=4, N/A=9
—	4c.	Recruiter give MOS wanted?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3, N/A=9
—	4c(1)	If no (4c=2 or 3), why not?: if not, EMERGE
—	4d.	Recruiter tell unit coming?: yes=1, no=2, don't recall=4, don't know=5, N/A=9

CODE SHEET (pg 3)

<i>Response</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Description</i>
—	5a.	Why join Reserve?: EMERGE
—	5b.	Expectations met?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3
—	5b(1)	If no (5b=2 or 3), why not?: EMERGE
—	6a.	Unit expecting you?: yes=1, no=2, 4=don't recall, 5=don't know
—	6b.	Orientation briefing?: yes=1, no=2, 4=don't recall, 5=don't know
—	6c.	Commander talk to newcomers?: yes=1, no=2, 4=don't recall, 5=don't know, 6=someone else did
—	6d.	Sponsor?: yes=1, no=2, 4=don't recall, N/A=9
—	6d(1)	Sponsor do a good job?: yes=1, no=2, 3=somewhat, 4=don't recall
—	6e.	Inprocessed?: yes=1 (w/in 2 drills), no=2, 3=somewhat (somewhat, but never returned to complete), 6=partially (delay, but happened)
—	7a.	Things as expected?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3
—	7b.	Anything better?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3
—	7b(1)	If yes (7b=1 or 3), EMERGE
—	7b(2)	When notice?: pre-entry=1, 1st drill=2, 2nd drill=3, 3rd drill=4, after IADT=5, during AT=6, after 3rd drill=7
—	7c.	Anything worse?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3
—	7c(1)	If yes (7c=1 or 3), EMERGE
—	7c(2)	When notice?: pre-entry=1, 1st drill=2, 2nd drill=3, 3rd drill=4, after IADT=5, more than 3 drills=6, during IADT=7
—	8	Stop attendance: before 2nd drill=1, 2-6 drills=2, 7-12 drills=3, more than 12 drills=4, don't recall=5

CODE SHEET (pg 4)

Response	Question	Description
—	9a	Main reason?: EMERGE
—	9b(1)	Other reasons?: First reason - EMERGE
—	9b(2)	Other reasons?: Second reason - EMERGE
—	10a.	Talk to COC?: yes=1, no=2, don't recall=4
—	10b.	If yes, who?: cdr=1, other officer=2, 1sgt=3, plt sgt=4, sqd ldr=5, retention NCO=6, UA/admin pers=7, other/friend=8, recruiter=10, other sgt=11
—	10c.	What did COC do?: EMERGE
—	11a.	Anyone try to get you to return? yes=1, no=2, 4=don't recall
—	11b.	If yes, who? cdr=1, other officer=2, 1sgt=3, plt sgt=4, sqd ldr=5, 0 retention NCO=6, UA=7, other/friend=8, recruiter=10, other sgt=11
—	11c.	What did they say? EMERGE
—	11d.	Why didn't you return?: EMERGE
—	12a.	Quality of commo w/ coworkers: very dissatisfied=1, dissatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5, N/A=9
—	12b.	Quality of commo w/ sergeants: very dissatisfied=1, dissatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5, N/A=9
—	12c.	Quality of commo w/ commander: very dissatisfied=1, dissatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5, N/A=9
—	12d.	How can improve commo?: EMERGE
—	12e.	Commo influence leaving?: yes=1, no=2, somewhat=3
—	13a.	Plan to rejoin?: yes=1, no=2, 3=maybe, 6=have rejoined

CODE SHEET (pg5)

<i>Response</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Description</i>
—	13a(1)	If rejoined (if #13a.=6), reason?: <i>EMERGE</i> N/A=9
—	13b.	What would get to rejoin (if #13a.=1, 2 or 3)?: <i>EMERGE</i>
—	13c.	What do you miss?: <i>EMERGE</i>
—	13d.	What don't you miss?: <i>EMERGE</i>
—	14.	Suggestion?: <i>EMERGE</i>

APPENDIX C. CODE BOOK

Code Book for emerge questions from the interview protocol

Questions: 2c, 3c, 5b(1), 7b(1), 7c(1), 9a, 9b(1), 9b(2), 13d

- 1 = unfair or restrictive policy (out of unit's control)
- 11 = fair policies
- 2 = conflict job/school
- 3 = negative- leadership treatment and skills (assignments, favoritism/politics/caring, respect)
- 33 = positive- leadership treatment and skills
- 4 = negative- training; lack of training at unit; no significant duties
- 44 = positive-meaningful training; significant duties
- 45 = negative-not given school/MOS/job; not working in MOS
- 55 = positive-given school/MOS/job
- 46 = negative- transportation problems/too far
- 66 = positive- unit close to home
- 7 = negative- processing slow/improper/incomplete (admin problems/pay/uniforms)
- 77 = positive- efficient processing
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = negative- general dissatisfaction with unit/Reserve/Army/military
- 20 = positive- general satisfaction with unit/Reserve/Army/military
- 12 = personal/family problems
- 13 = negative- inclusion in unit (unfriendly, not integrated)
- 23 = positive- inclusion in unit (welcomed, integrated)
- 14 = negative- hours/work schedule (did not like)
- 24 = positive- hours/work schedule (liked)
- 15 = negative- people in unit (enemies)
- 25 = positive- people in unit (friends)
- 16 = negative- atmosphere (not challenging, unexciting)
- 26 = positive- atmosphere (challenging, exciting)
- 36 = negative- atmosphere (too challenging)
- 46 = positive- atmosphere (laid back/ low stress)
- 17 = negative- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards too low
- 27 = positive- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards fair
- 37 = negative- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards too high
- 18 = negative- equipment (lack of quality/quantity equipment)
- 28 = positive- equipment (had quality/quantity equipment)
- 29 = unit deactivated/moved/relocated
- 30 = member relocated
- 31 = negative- other benefits (didn't travel enough, etc.)

- 41 = positive- other benefits/opportunities (travel, food, promotion, etc.)
- 50 = negative- communications (poor communications)
- 60 = positive- communications (good communications)
- 51 = general military duties (did not like details, field, PT, PMCS, getting up in morning)
- 52 = negative-individuals in COC (commander, first sergeant, sergeants)
- 62 = positive- individuals in COC
- 53 = money problems (bonus, school loan, pay)
- 54 = recruiter gave inaccurate information
- 80 = "I do not know what I do not miss"
- 91 = "Nothing was different than reality"
- 95 = "Nothing was better than I expected"
- 96 = "Nothing was worse than I expected"
- 97 = no second or third reason as to why the reservist left the unit
- 99 = "I do not miss anything"

Questions: 5a, 13a(1), 13a(2), 13b:

- 1 = affiliation/affinity for military/Army/Reserve
- 2 = complete contract obligation/enlistment
- 3 = money for education
- 4 = money- salary/pay/bonus
- 5 = training/experience/learning
- 6 = influence of family/friends
- 7 = structured environment (discipline, maturity, challenge)
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = other benefits (promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, etc.)
- 11 = transportation – unit closer to home
- 12 = rejoined another service, branch of military reserve
- 13 = trying to rejoin, would join anyway
- 14 = flexible work schedule
- 15 = new job/new MOS/ MOS of choice
- 16 = get into same unit
- 17 = military schooling
- 18 = increase standards/standards like active duty
- 19 = new unit/unit of choice
- 20 = same rank back/promotion
- 21 = better training
- 22 = flexibility/change in policies
- 23 = improve leadership (communication, treatment, control, etc.)
- 25 = opportunity to go active duty
- 80 = "I do not know what would get me to rejoin"
- 85 = "I am not sure what would get me to rejoin"
- 93 = "Nothing would get me to rejoin"

97 = "I miss nothing," or "nothing could get me to rejoin"

Question 4c(1):

- 1 = desired MOS was not available/not feasible
- 2 = test scores not high enough
- 3 = given no choice
- 4 = received MOS already qualified for (no opportunity for retraining)
- 5 = told get particular MOS, but didn't
- 6 = disqualified for desired MOS (colorblind, speeding ticket)
- 7 = misinformed/mix-up by inducting organization (MEPs, recruiter)
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 80 = "I don't know why I didn't get the MOS I wanted"

Question 10c:

- 1 = look into it/see if anything could do
- 2 = take a specific action (excuse, give school/MOS)
- 3 = nothing could do
- 4 = transfer/discharge without penalty
- 5 = things would get better/fixed in future
- 6 = did not want to listen/brush-off
- 7 = told me to rectify the situation (take PT test, submit letter of documentation for absence)
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = told me to rectify situation
- 90 = "COC said nothing"

Question 11c:

- 1 = stated rules/policies (drill dates, required documentation for absences)
- 2 = asked me to come back
- 3 = ordered me to come back
- 4 = convinced me to come back
- 5 = inquired about situation (why wasn't at drill, why wasn't reenlisting)
- 6 = tried to rectify situation (find me a ride, excuse an absence, etc.)
- 7 = left a message
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = never got back to me/never followed up
- 94 = "COC did nothing"

Question 11d:

- 1 = situation unresolved/wouldn't get resolved
- 2 = general dissatisfaction (fed up, had it, etc.)
- 3 = job conflict
- 4 = personal problems
- 5 = tried to change units
- 6 = wasn't going to get job/MOS
- 7 = no significant duties; waste of my time
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = could not return (slots filled, already transferred to IRR, etc.)

Question 12d:

- 1 = COC needs to establish information channels (suggestion box, open door policy, communications training, family support group, formations, etc.)
- 2 = COC listen/help/take care of reservists
- 3 = improve general communications (top to bottom, increase phone contact, contact w/ reservist's family members, etc.)
- 4 = hold COC accountable for reservists/training/schedule/discipline
- 5 = COC establish a better newcomer program/talk to newcomers more
- 6 = identify the COC; use the COC; improve communications among COC
- 7 = COC more accessible/available
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = replace leadership (commander, COC)
- 11 = policy change (increase drill time, give reservists more leeway, increase prior service soldier's in unit)
- 12 = communications does not need improvement
- 13 = reduce changes in unit (personnel/job changes)

Question 13c:

- 1 = affiliation with unit/military/Reserve/Army/pride
- 2 = people, friends
- 3 = camaraderie/cohesion
- 4 = job, learning, experience, training
- 5 = discipline, structured environment
- 6 = pay
- 92 = "I miss nothing"

Question 14:

- 1 = flexible policies (give one more chance, etc.)
- 2 = increase leadership care/interest in reservists (acknowledge for a good job, etc.)
- 3 = increase pay/benefits
- 4 = better training/training plan
- 5 = better communications (between leadership and reservists, etc.)
- 6 = transportation (put in unit closer to home)
- 7 = flexible work schedule (RST's, etc.)
- 8 = other
- 9 = NA/no information
- 10 = brief on what to expect in unit/opportunities for reservists
- 11 = increase the enforcement standards (like Army, like basic, etc.)
- 12 = integrate reservists into the unit
- 13 = improve accuracy of recruiter information
- 14 = job (make sure have a job before assign to a unit)
- 15 = increase opportunities for military schools/promotion
- 21 = decrease standards
- 80 = "I don't know"

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